
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Special Issue:

CIA and the MEDIA

CovertAction Information Bulletin



Editorial

Carlucci Passses Ball to Boland

We owe our readers an apology. In our last editorial we suggested that the legislation being urged by Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci to criminalize our "Naming Names" column was so obviously unconstitutional that the Agency would have to get one of its hacks to introduce it. To our surprise, on October 17, the entire House Select Committee on Intelligence introduced H.R. 5615, the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act." The bill combines an anti-Agee bill with an anti-CovertAction bill.

The first part makes it a crime for anyone who has access to confidential information identifying undercover intelligence officers, employees, agents, informants, or "sources of operational assistance," to disclose such information. The second part makes it also a crime for anyone else to disclose such information "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." When introducing the bill, Rep. Boland, the Chairman of the Select Committee, admitted, "I fully realize that this latter provision will be controversial. It could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources."

Precisely. This is the first time that a genuine Official Secrets Act has been on the floor of Congress in some time. This bill, by the CIA's own admission, was drafted and spoon-fed to the Committee by them. Though it is not aimed solely at us, that is what the Agency would like people to believe. The primary victims of such legislation would be both whistleblowers inside the government and investigative journalists outside. That it is limited to information which identifies officers or agents is of little signifi-

cance, because it is virtually impossible to expose illegal or immoral activity within government without disclosing who is responsible for, or involved with, the crimes. As we have said from the outset, you cannot separate the operations from the operators.

We will have more to say on this bill as a campaign against it takes shape. We are concerned that people will take the apathetic view that the bill is so extreme that there is no chance of its becoming law. That sort of complacency, particularly in an election year, could be disastrous. Journalists must be made aware of the ramifications of this bill. It would totally outlaw much of the investigative journalism which has led to the exposure of Watergate, of My Lai, of such mundane matters as the massive CIA payments to the King of Jordan. (Talk about identifying a "source of operational assistance"!)

The other danger to be guarded against is an overconcern with the second part of the bill—clearly in violation of the First Amendment—to the detriment of the first part of the bill—which still denies freedom of speech to government workers. Journalists may rally to their own defense, but they must fight as well for the whistleblowers within government, without whom they would never have many of the stories they publish. What chance for any intelligence reform at all would there be if the books of Marchetti, Marks, Agee, Stockwell, Snepp, Smith and Corson were illegal?

Richard Welch and the Ayatollah Khomeini

What do they have in common, you say? Well, just this. For years we have taken the position that although we

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name names and expose CIA officers and operations—out of our distaste for what the CIA has become—we have never felt that doing so placed them in physical danger. This is because their value as undercover subverters and corrupters is lost when they are exposed. Still, whenever we point out that we are not in favor of assassination as a political method, the Richard Welch red-herring is resurrected.

Thus it was with considerable trepidition that we followed the news of the capture of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. We hoped that no harm would come to the hostages. (As this is written the hostages are still in custody, and still unharmed.) It was clear, though, that the U.S. government had no business staffing such a large Embassy in such a hostile environment. It was as if they had learned no lesson at all from the fall of the Shah. Be that as it may, it was clear to us that if we had any names of CIA personnel assigned to the Tehran Embassy, we would not print them under the existing circumstances.

Imagine our consternation when, within days of the takeover of the Embassy, we were swamped with calls from reporters with the networks, the wire services, and many major national newspapers and magazines, asking, almost pleading, for the names of CIA personnel in Tehran. "Off the record," they begged, "I promise I won't tell anyone." It was an object lesson all right. Some of the same people who cluck their tongues when we publish our magazine were thirsting for blood, for an international incident, for a page one by-line.

About This Issue

For some time we have been preparing a special issue concentrating on the CIA and the media. We hope that our readers find much of this issue valuable, not only the new information, but also the reference material.

This issue we present a number of outside contributors. Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch, two correspondents for Peoples News Service in London, and experienced free-lance writers as well, have contributed an in-depth analysis of Robert Moss, one of the intelligence complex's most literate, if not necessarily most accurate, sympathizers. Philip Agee has added his own personal Robert Moss story.

A major focus of this issue is the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica—a consequence of the massive CIA-inspired media campaign being waged on that island. In addition to our overview of the situation, we are pleased to include additional analyses by Fred Landis, the foremost expert on the use by the CIA of *El Mercurio* in the overthrow of Allende, and by Cecilio Morales, Jr., the Washington correspondent for the respected *Latin America Weekly Report*.

We also include an examination of the newly refurbished Jonas Savimbi campaign and a letter about him by former Angola Task Force Chief, John Stockwell; an analysis of the CIA media budget by well-known economist and author Sean Gervasi, and an astonishing review of Kermit Roosevelt's new book by an insider who knows as much about the subject as Roosevelt himself, and is a good deal more honest.

Finally, we continue our regular features. Naming Names and Sources and Methods. About the latter, our readers should know that last issue's Ken Lawrence column, on the CIA's use of cockroaches to trail people, was covered by several wire services and led to half a dozen radio interviews and news articles. Never underestimate the power of bugs. This issue Lawrence gets into pigeons.

Sources and Methods

By Ken Lawrence

Pigeon Intelligence?

A few months ago several articles appeared in the papers about how the Coast Guard is spending \$146,000 to train a rescue squad of pigeons to find people lost at sea.

The reports indicated that the pigeon patrol was a stunning success—scoring 90 percent as opposed to a poor 38 percent scored by a human air crew searching for the same lost souls.

Strangely enough, at the same time these stories were appearing, the Navy was ordered to search the waters off Southeast Asia for the so-called "boat people" adrift at sea after leaving Vietnam. But none of the news accounts

mentioned using the pigeons to find the boat people, an obvious thing to do if the birds are really so adept at their duty.

This is so obvious, in fact, that it makes one pause to wonder whether the press reports about the pigeons were part of an elaborate cover story for something altogether different. If so, it would not be the first time. A few years ago the Navy told several fascinating stories about psychological and communications research to hide the fact that dolphins were being trained and used as underwater assas-

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THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO JAMAICA:

A CASE STUDY IN MEDIA MANIPULATION AND DESTABILIZATION

By Ellen Ray

In July, 1979 Ulises Estrada Lescaille, the new Cuban Ambassador, was due to arrive in Kingston, Jamaica. For the entire month preceding his arrival the conservative Daily Gleaner newspaper, in conjunction with the opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and its leader Edward Seaga, relentlessly pursued a campaign of disinformation the likes of which had not been seen on that Caribbean island since the notorious CIA destabilization effort of 1976. And since last summer an international barrage of attacks-lies, distortions, outright threats-has beset the Cubar Ambassador and his host, Prime Minister Michael Manley. Fanning the flames have been such well-known toadies of Western intelligence as Robert Moss [see the articles in this issue by Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch, and by Philip Agee], reactionary and CIA-connected newspapers and wire services, dubious awards ceremonies bestowing false honors [see the article in this issue by Fred Landis], even the U.S. State Department. Observers can only marvel at the sophistication of the campaign, its dimensions, and, of course, its probable cost. Who is paying for it remains a major question.

Manley has become, in the past few years, one of the most respected leaders of the entire Third World, a major force in the Non-Aligned Movement. The socialist tenor of his government, and particularly its close relations with Cuba, have State Department and other hard-liners frantic. The U.S. government's "shock" when Manley supported the Puerto Rican independence movement was probably, in one sense, real. Far more dangerous to U.S. interests, however, is Manley's role, as described by the Washington Post, in outlining "a new economic accord under which oil-producing states would give special consideration to their energy-scarce brothers within the movement." Manley, almost single-handedly, drew from the OPEC members of the Non-Aligned Movement a commitment to lower prices or credits or terms of payment for the r customers within the group—a commitment which must, of course, in the end cost the West.



Ambassador Ulises Estrada

Right Wing's "Target of Opportunity"

As elections in Jamaica draw closer, the media-manufactured crisis has escalated dramatically, with Ambassador Estrada a "target of opportunity" for the right wing. As Fred Landis points out elsewhere in this issue, the analogies between the CIA's destabilization of the Allende government in Chile and the current turmoil in Jamaica are considerable. The two most common methods, he notes, were a supposed defense of freedom of the press and an emphasis on ties with Cuba. Both methods are at the fore of the Estrada affair. The JLP/ Daily Gleaner attacks on the Ambassador are really cover for their attack on the government which recognizes him. Once again a coalition of forces, mainly outside Jamaica, have united in an attempt to unseat the Manley government by whatever means necessary.

The orchestrated campaign against Estrada began with a bluster of rhetoric, but has recently turned violent, reminiscent again of 1976. On June 30, before the Ambassador arrived, the Gleaner announced that Seaga and the JLP were checking into the Ambassador-designate's background, particularly his ties with various African liberation movements and with Palestinian organizations. If such linkages turned out to be "as reported" (by whom, or to what effect, is unclear), the JLP would "launch demonstrations and pursue him to every corner until he departs."

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Also in June, Seaga was interviewed by the Miami Herald, always a willing outlet for anti-Cuban fervor, given the nature of its readership. He railed against Manley for "covertly establishing a Cuban-style apparatus that will supplant democratic forms." He then went on to contradict himself by claiming that Manley's party, the Peoples National Party (PNP) is taking "the third route to communism," not the elected route, not the route of violent overthrow, but the route of gaining power under false pretenses—"the Euro-communist model." In October, incidentally, Seaga reversed himself again, stating that Manley was preparing for "the military solution."

"Freedom of Press" Threat Claimed

In the same Miami Herald article, Clifton Nieta, the managing editor of the Gleaner, expressed very partisan support for the JLP and contempt for Manley. Yet two days later the Herald reprinted a piece Nieta wrote for the Wall Street Journal in which he claimed that the Gleaner "grinds no axes except public ones and supports no political party." This is quite a revelation, since Hector Wynter, the editor, is a former Chairman of the JLP, and has recently fired a number of the Gleaner's more experienced journalists because of their objections to the increasingly outrageous and unprincipled attacks on the Prime Minister. The real message of Nieta's piece was to introduce the charge that Manley was planning to shut down the Gleaner—the "freedom of the press" campaign which would be used with more and more frequency, against both the government and the Cuban Ambassador. The foolishness of the charge was pointed out in Harper's Magazine, which wryly observed that "hardly a day goes by that the newspapers do not prove their own editorials wrong, by freely publishing lurid accounts of the death of freedom of the press.'

Another peculiar piece of the Gleaner puzzle was alluded to by Nieta, who related how, in 1978, the Gleaner was forced to go public with a still private stock offering to pay off its debts, and how the poor people of Jamaica rushed out to buy up millions of dollars of shares in sums of \$50 or \$100, on the premise that "in order to save Jamaica you had to save the Gleaner." He does not explain how a paper in such straits can afford to publish a weekly North American edition, with the high cost of publishing in the U.S., the devalued Jamaican dollar, and the limited readership of such a paper. Nor does he really clarify who put just how much into the Gleaner, under admittedly "unattractive" terms.

International Campaign Inaugurated

Shortly thereafter, still prior to Estrada's arrival in Jamaica, the world-wide, coordinated attack against him began. From papers as far away as Hong Kong and as near as Mexico and Venezuela came stories of the new Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, alleging that he was an intelligence officer. All of the articles can be traced to a single, unsigned piece by Robert Moss in "Foreign Report," cal-

ling Estrada part of "the Palestinian Mafia.... the former head of Cuban intelligence in Cairo, and the new tool for subversion in the Caribbean." Seaga repeated these allegations at his Washington press conference. Estrada, it should be noted, denies that he has ever spent any time in Egypt.

Seaga's U.S. Trip

Seaga was exceptionally active during this period. On July 4th he spoke at a fund-raising dinner at the University of Miami to the newly-formed Freedom League of Greater Miami, described by one journalist as a small reactionary group primarily made up of Cuban exiles with some rightwing Jamaicans and Barbadians. "A burst of documented evidence," Seaga claimed, has proved that the Cuban and Soviet governments have infiltrated Jamaica. He didn't say where the burst of documents came from, or what they were, but a few months later Washington journalists and State Department officials were treated to endless copies of the "Seaga Papers." [see the article in this issue by Cecilio Morales, Jr.]



EDWARD MAGA

Seaga also made the startling—but subsequently easily disproved—statement that there were over 5000 Cubans in Jamaica. "Manley and Castro are in the same bed," he exhorted his mainly Cuban audience. He also pointed out that one of Manley's ministers was seen at the home of a Cuban diplomat whom Seaga said was the head of intelligence. Some time later, it was discovered that the diplomat was the counsel to the new Ambassador, and the meeting was a perfectly ordinary one. In Miami, Seaga also insisted that he was under constant government surveillance, followed and wiretapped, with a police surveillance unit next to his home. He never made such allegations in Jamaica, though, where no one would believe them.

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At a meeting of the Twentieth Congress of the Peoples Progressive Party of Guyana, a Cuban diplomat responded to some of the Gleaner's charges, referring to a "hysterical campaign of slander and lies." He described the Gleaner as "reactionary," and referred to documented CIA connections. The Gleaner, hardly known for temperate language, professed outrage and demanded that the Jamaican Foreign Ministry lodge a formal protest. The comments in Guyana, they said, were "a dangerous act of interference with the free press of Jamaica." They demanded that Ambassador Estrada, who had just arrived in Jamaica, apologize for his country. The Foreign Ministry refused to take orders from the Gleaner, the Ambassador did not apologize for his colleague, and the rival Jamaica Daily News noted that the description of the Gleaner as "reactionary" was nothing if not accurate.

Ambassador Answers Smear Campaign

After unceasing demands that he respond, the Ambassador finally called a press conference, and reiterated the point made in Guyana, that there was a campaign of lies being circulated against him by the Gleaner and the JLP. The campaign against Cuba, he said, "has been personalized to become even a campaign against the new Ambassador who publicly was threatened with demonstrations against him." His government had the right to protest against these lies; the more the lies were repeated, the more likely that people might believe them. As Ambassador, he said, it was not proper for him to respond personally to irresponsible attacks; but "we have means to answer all over the world and to begin to say our truths." He concluded that, "if war is declared by anyone, the Cuban Revolution has always been characterized by accepting the challenge, and as Comrade Fidel has said, 'when the Cubans say we fight, we fight seriously."

Much to the Ambassador's amazement, the Gleaner, with incredible self-righteousness, chose to interpret these remarks as threatening physical violence to anyone who disagreed with him. In a page one editorial the next day they called upon the government "to denounce Mr. Estrada's irresponsible behavior and to declare him persona non grata so that he may be recalled." The Gleaner claimed that Estrada was threatening freedom of the press, threatening Jamaicans and interfering in internal politics. Although the Ambassador issued a statement clarifying the remarks, insisting that he was clearly referring to verbal struggle, to "communication," every conservative organization in Jamaica protested his "threats"—the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, the Private Sector Organization, the Jamaica Manufacturers Association.

The Gleaner printed all of these attacks. The same day, the Inter American Press Association jumped into the picture [see the Fred Landis article for the ties between the CIA and IAPA]. Declaring Estrada's remarks "abusive attacks on the Gleaner," they said, "this intolerable and threatening statement by a representative of totalitarian government, which does not allow freedom of expression, will surely come before the IAPA's annual meeting next month in Toronto." Not remarkably, the next month the



Prime Minister Michael Manley

CIA-riddled IAPA duly condemned the attempts of "foreign diplomats" to "intimidate the free and independent press of Jamaica."


P.M. Calls Press Conference

As the memory of Estrada's exact words dimmed, the Gleaner became more and more strident, insisting that the Ambassador was threatening "reprisals" against Jamaicans, and "war" against the country. Prime Minister Manley was forced to call his own press conference, at which he pointed out that the Ambassador had stressed the long-standing friendship between the people of Jamaica and Cuba-indeed, Jamaica, under a JLP government in the 1960s, had refused to comply with the U.S. blockade of Cuba. He noted that the Ambassador had continually referred to a "war of words." Yet, the Prime Minister said, the Gleaner had chosen, "in a malicious and deliberate act ... with malice aforethought, to pretend that those words mean that Cuba was threatening Jamaica." The Prime Minister noted that the Gleaner was now assiduously lying on a daily basis.

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As the Prime Minister rallied his responding forces, the battle was not all one sided. The Federation of Progressive Forces was launched and named a working committee to request the Press Association of Jamaica to conduct a "public inquiry into the Gleaner's abuses of press freedom, to organize a public meeting to expose the Gleaner's abuses, report to the International Organization of Journalists, and UNESCO the Gleaner's unethical practices." The PAJ did set up the public inquiry, a respected panel of civic leaders was selected, and the investigation of the Gleaner is expected to last many months.

The international campaign alleging Cuban and Soviet dominance of Jamaica picked up in the meantime. In September, an issue of Business Week noted that "Seaga has charged repeatedly—with considerable documentation—that Cuban intelligence agents as well as Soviet secret police have infiltrated the Manley administration." The "documentation," as noted elsewhere in this issue, is totally fabricated. Ominously, Business Week said, referring to the upcoming elections, "The question posed by many observers is whether those elections will ever take place." The only "observer" making that observation, however, was Seaga himself.



Other magazines, such as Barrons, echoed the same line, but most outrageous of all was the series of articles by Robert Moss in the Daily Telegraph which culminated, on October 8, with a piece in which he claimed that "it has been a long standing ambition of President Castro and his Soviet mentors to convert Jamaica into 'an Anglophone Cuba," according to a "defector from Cuban intelligence."

On September 25 the JLP carried out the threat it had made even before Estrada arrived, by calling for a demonstration to protest his presence and the presence of Cuban volunteers in Jamaica-doctors, construction workers, etc.—and the government's acquiescence in this. Chanting slogans against Cuba and carrying placards reading "Communist Pigs Go Back to Cuba," the JLP marched against the Cuban Embassy and Government House. The crowd accosted several government officials who were shot at. A counterdemonstration appeared and the two groups clashed. Government supporters then marched to the Gleaner offices with pro-Cuban placards. Outside the building, speakers, including the Prime Minister, proclaimed their message: "Freedom of the press, yes. But no more lies." The demonstration then moved to the Cuban Embassy to express solidarity with the Ambassador.

Foreign Media Descends

JLP began to call for all-island demonstrations leading to a general strike. They invited foreign journalists to Jamaica, "to cover any political developments which may arise." Nineteen came, including *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *New York Times*, the *Miami Herald*, and the London *Daily Telegraph*, from September 28 till October 6.

Casting modesty to the winds, Seaga announced at a rally that the Cubans and the PNP had joined together "to attack me, the JLP, the Gleaner Company, and the United States of America." He said that Estrada was "Manley's boss," and that "war" was beginning. Deputy JLP Leader Pearnell Charles, who had been jailed during the 1976 emergency for planning the overthrow of the government with outside forces [see CounterSpy magazine, December 1976], made frequent allegations of PNP plots to shoot up their own meetings and blame it on the JLP.

The PNP protested these statements, saying that they were laying the groundwork for a new onslaught of political violence such as that of 1976. Sure enough, a week later the JLP instigated a disturbance where Jamaican and Cuban construction workers were shot at, and a few days later, shots rang out and interrupted the final ceremony of National Heroes Day. It was just a few days later that Seaga made his most recent U.S. tour, including the provocative speech in Washington, where he accused the government of planning a "military solution."

It seems obvious that the situation in Jamaica is critical. The parallels to the last years of the Allende government in Chile are too obvious and too frequent to ignore. The Gleaner is fulfilling, with relish, the role of El Mercurio; but there is no reason to believe that the role of the U.S. intelligence complex has changed hands at all. Seaga's meetings with State Department officials and National Security Council personnel are known. The entire international campaign against the Cuban presence in Jamaica, and against the Ambassador in particular, are part of a sophisticated counter-intelligence plan related to U.S. intervention in the Caribbean in general, and in Jamaica in particular.

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
SEAGA'S SLEIGHT OF HAND TRIPS UP JACK ANDERSON

One of Edward Seaga's worst kept secrets is a sheaf of "documents" which purportedly link Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley to Soviet and Cuban intelligence officers. Seaga, leader of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party, is known to have passed the papers on to Carter Administration officials, among them the National Security Council's Robert Pastor, during a two-day visit to Washington in October.

Shortly after the visit, the Seaga Papers, allegedly a sampling of files from Manley's Peoples National Party, began to be selectively leaked to the press by U.S. government officials. Initially State Department officials themselves had circulated the merchandise at high echelons, setting off a chain of second generation Seaga Papers, with the State Department imprimatur, and, in the case of at least one set, with the signature of the soon to be replaced Assistant Secretary of State, Viron P. Vaky. At his press conference at the National Press Club, Seaga admitted that he had met with Vaky, but refused to disclose what they had discussed.

Subsequently Jack Anderson's staff obtained the Vaky memo, but not the "documents," and ran a story which credited Vaky, a former Inter-American Bureau Chief (incorrectly billed as Undersecretary) with the "knowledge" that Manley was close to the KGB. Had they bothered to contact either Seaga or his White House friends, they might have stumbled on to a set of papers, which, as documentary evidence, are softer than the raw clams in the Caribbean.

The papers comprise a crude chart, two spurious memos and a strange list of names. The highly inflammatory chart—it is unclear whether this is supposed to be a PNP document or merely Seaga's Guide for the Perplexed outlines an alleged political liaison network, with, at the top, "58 Jamaicans" at Jamaica House, the Prime Minister's offices, linked to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Manley and Claude Robinson, his former Press Secretary, are linked via Arnold Bertram, the Minister of Mobilization, Information and Culture, to KGB agents, DGI agents, other ministers also connected to KGB and DGI, and to the Workers Party of Jamaica. Indeed, the mesh of lines, which resemble in their complexity a map of the British Railway, all cross through the WPJ Secretary General, Trevor Munroe, incorrectly identified as the "leader of the Communist Party of Jamaica." There is a



Seaga's "Chart"

small Jamaican Communist Party, distinct from the WPJ; moreover, at his press conference, Seaga referred to Munroe as a secret member of the PNP.

Also linked by arrows to Bertram, and to Hugh Small, Minister of Youth and Sports, is "Juan Cabonel, DGI Field Organiser." This perpetuates one of Seaga's major faux pas. In June of this year, he exposed the "newly arrived" head of DGI in Jamaica, Juan Cabonel, who, he announced, had arrived clandestinely in Jamaica the preceding night, to take over the reins of DGI in Jamaica. The story was touted on the front page of the Daily Gleaner, picked up by the Miami Herald and other papers, and reprinted in the Congressional Record by Seaga's acquaintance, arch right wing Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia. What Seaga did not know was that Juan Carbonel (he had the name wrong) had been a wellknown consular official at the Cuban Embassy in Jamaica for three years, and was returning, the previous day, from his annual vacation. The diplomatic community in Kingston, all of whom knew Carbonel, were bemused by Seaga's mistake.

"Seaga's chart also shows Minister of Security, Dudley Thompson, linked to a KGB officer, but with the annotation "not trusted totally by the Russians."

The memos accompanying the chart seem obvious forgeries. One discussed Small's role in supervising the "indoctrination" of a construction brigade sent to Cuba; but that brigade was no secret, funded openly and publicly by the Housing Ministry, not Small's portfolio. The documents refer to Robinson's role as "documenting," with a link to the KBG; yet "documenting" is an ominous label applied to the pedestrian activities of a press secretary.

The final document purports to be a list of police officers slated "to get Special Branch training and death squad work." If a government had a death squad, which in the case of Jamaica appears ludicrous, it strains the imagination to believe that it would publish lists of the members and refer to them by such a name.

Remarkably, this sloppy "documentation" does not seem to have affected Seaga's credibility with the National Security Council, even though the latest piece of "intelligence" contains no authenticating evidence of any kind, no letterhead, no signatures, indeed nothing that could be traced back other than to an overactive imagination. Yet State Department officials continue to admit that Seaga is a major source of U.S. intelligence on Jamaica.

Of course, some skeptics believe that Jamaica, and the Seaga Papers, are merely chess pieces in Zbigniew Brzezinski's game of cold war in the Caribbean. The prize, it is said, would be Cyrus Vance's post, Secretary of State.

-By Cecilio Morales, Jr.

Cecilio Morales, Jr., is a correspondent for the London-based Latin America Weekly Report.

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sins. Probably the most famous such lie was the CIA's tale that the Glomar Explorer spy ship was supposedly a deep-sea mining vessel owned by Howard Hughes.

If the pigeons aren't out searching for lost boat people, what are they doing? One possibility is they may be spying on Soviet submarines. This, too, would not be unprecedented; during World War II the British used sea gulls to patrol the coast for German U-boats. Robert Lubow described the technique in *The War Animals* (Doubleday & Co., 1977, \$7.95):

"A truly novel approach, and one that is exquisitely simple, was said to have been employed by the British. As anyone who lives near the seashore knows, flocks of sea gulls will congregate around refuse dumps, fishing boats unloading their catch, or any other easy source of food. It is a common sight, for instance, to see several gulls trailing a ship waiting for the garbage to be dumped overboard, or for some passenger to amuse himself by throwing crusts of bread into the air which the agile gulls will then catch in their beaks.

"It is reported that British submarines submerged off the English coast released large amounts of bread. The bread, floating to the surface, would be spotted by local gulls, and soon an entire flock would be circling and diving in the area of the bread and the submarine. There is no information available as to how many times this association of events, bread and submarine, had to be repeated before the sea gulls began to appear at the sight of the submarine alone. However, it is told that when the gulls spotted a long, dark shadow moving beneath the surface of the waters, they would proceed to flock to that place. Wheeling and screeching, they were observed by human spotters on the shore. The location of the swarming gulls was reported, and if that location did not coincide with the known position of a friendly submarine, the appropriate military countermeasures were initiated. It is not known how many German U-boats became victims of the scavenger gull's insatiable search for food."

Unlike the wheeling, screeching gulls, the pigeons signal they've found their quarry by pecking a switch. Instead of a whole flock, it takes only a crew of three. Three pigeons and some bird seed—that's something to think about when the Senate's hawks scream that U.S. intelligence can't "verify" Soviet military presence.

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THE CIA AND THE MEDIA: IAPA AND THE JAMAICA DAILY GLEANER

By Fred Landis

Fred Landis is the author of Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile, 1970-1973, and a former researcher for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee). He is at present a journalist in Santa Barbara, California.

In its efforts to influence, and perhaps topple, the government of Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica, the CIA has used proprietary wire services, agents, assets, a major international press organization, and stock propaganda themes. These efforts have been on a hemispherewide basis, but are currently most evident in the local anti-Manley newspaper, the Daily Gleaner. The close partnership between the Gleaner and the Inter American Press Association, described herein, is a case study of present day CIA covert propaganda. Indeed, the methodology employed is strikingly similar to the CIA's use of El Mercurio against Chilean President Salvador Allende.

The story is complicated, and intertwined, but revolves around IAPA and its General Manager, James B. Canel. In what follows, we try to unravel the many threads of this story.

Prizes

In October 1979 the Daily Gleaner received the Maria Moors Cabot citation in recognition of its services in defense of "press freedom in Latin America." Serving on the Board which awards the Cabot citations is James B. Canel, General Manager of the Miami-based IAPA. Although the prize is administered by the Columbia University School of Journalism in New York City, the Board is totally independent of the University, and is, reportedly, a creature of IAPA. Canel, in fact, is part of a select group which has been giving awards to each other for some time. In 1960, Canel himself received the Cabot award. In 1972, Canel gave the IAPA "Freedom of the Press" award to Arturo Fontaine of El Mercurio. Simultaneously the American Legion gave its "Freedom of the Press" award to El Mercurio owner, Agustin Edwards, a multi-millionaire who owned vast resources in Chile. At the ceremony honoring Edwards were the past four IAPA presidents.

It was not until December 1975 that the Senate Select Committee report "Covert Action in Chile: 1964-1974"

revealed that the day after a September 14, 1970 meeting between Edwards and CIA Director Richard Helms, the now famous meeting between Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Helms occurred in the Oval Office, at which time they sanctioned the destabilization of the Allende government, and in February 1979 with the use of classified documents, Inquiry magazine revealed that both Fontaine and Edwards were CIA agents. In fact, Edwards is known to have been a CIA agent since 1958, running other agents, laundering CIA money, and the like. Edwards, a long-time crony of Nixon, and whose cousin is married to David Rockefeller, is at present well placed as the vice-president of Pepsi-Cola's international division. Edwards was president of IAPA in 1969, and both he and another CIA operative from El Mercurio, Rene Silva Espejo, are still on the IAPA board. In 1968 Edwards had been chairman of IAPA's Freedom of the Press Committee, which during the past decade has given its awards to the wire services discussed below, who, of course, reciprocate.

Wire Services

The major CIA-connected wire services reaching Latin America and the Caribbean are Agencia Orbe Latino-americano, Copley News Service, Forum World Features, and LATIN. (Two other wire services reaching the Caribbean, Reuters-CANA and World Features Services, are reputed to have ties to British intelligence—but that is not within the scope of this article.) The Daily Gleaner has subscribed to, and run stories from, both English-language services. In addition, since the exposures



of many of the services, the *Gleaner* has taken to running wire service articles, often datelined Washington, with no source attribution at all.

Agencia Orbe Latinoamericano was identified by Philip Agee in "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" as a feature news service serving most of Latin America, financed and controlled by the CIA through the Santiago, Chile station.

Copley News Service was identified in the August 1977 Penthouse in an article by investigative reporters Joe Trento and Dave Roman as "the only [media] organization that the CIA had 'full cooperation with' for nearly three decades," and was later confirmed by the New York Times as "the CIA's eyes and ears in Latin America."

Forum World Features, incorporated in Delaware but based in London, produced six articles a week plus photographs for 150 newspapers in some 50 countries around the world, including the United States. It was exposed as a C1A proprietary in the summer of 1975 by the London magazine Time Out, and later in the London Guardian, the Irish Times, the Washington Post, and More magazine. In the May 1978 More, freelance author Russell Warren Howe, who worked for a number of years for the FWF—unaware of its Agency relationship—described it as "the principal C1A media effort in the world."

LATIN was identified in 1975 by the New York Times as a CIA wire service, eliciting a sharp rebuttal from former CIA Director Richard Helms. LATIN was not, technically, a proprietary, but CIA agents and CIA funds played a crucial role in its development. Fraudulently proclaiming itself as the first Third World news service, LATIN was started and owned by two former IAPA presidents to offset the influence of Cuba's Prensa Latina. According to a former LATIN executive, it developed out of the practice of Agustin Edwards calling Julio de Mesquita Neto, publisher of the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo, and yet another IAPA president, every Thursday afternoon to exchange information. By July 1971 LATIN had been consolidated into a hemisphere-wide wire service owned by El Mercurio and four Brazilian newspapers. In 1974 the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica attempted, through indirect means, to purchase LATIN. These efforts were thwarted by Edwards who personally laid out a cool \$400,000 to do so. Despite denials by both Helms and Edwards, the January 16, 1976 Washington Post identified LATIN as a CIA wire service.

The Hub

The Inter American Press Association, with its own wire service reaching some 1000 newspapers, is the hub of the entire Latin American media operation. Its past presidents and board members read almost like a roster of key CIA agents in the Latin American media. The late James S. Copley, founder of Copley News Service, whose CIA ties date back to before 1953, was president of IAPA in 1970. Two other CIA agents still at Copley are current IAPA board members. Agustin Edwards was president of IAPA in 1969, as noted, and Neto was president in 1972. One of

Edwards' CIA operatives from *El Mercurio* is also on the present IAPA board. IAPA, in short is the intersection of the CIA's propaganda operations in Latin America.

In the Senate report discussed earlier it states that, as part of its war against Allende, "the CIA, through its covert action resources, orchestrated a protest statement from an international press association and world press coverage of the association's protest." In its classified version the report identified the association as IAPA. The individual whom the CIA contacted in September 1970, and who issued the protest, was James B. Canel.

The History of IAPA

The IAPA began in 1926 as the first Pan American Congress of Journalists, at the instigation of the U.S. State Department acting through the American Society of Newspaper Editors. During World War II, it devoted itself to counteracting pro-Axis propaganda in Latin America. After the war, though, the Pan American Congress of Journalists was not as willing to follow the lead of the State Department as it had been. Instead of viewing this as a natural consequence of the lack of a common enemy to rally against, the State Department attributed the change in mood to national chauvinism and communist sympathies among the Latin American delegates.

Thus, in 1950, the CIA orchestrated a coup. The annual congress was to be held in the United States that year, and the CIA had the State Department refuse a visa for any member which the CIA considered suspect. The approved delegates then met and voted to reorganize the association in such a manner that only publishers, proprietors, and editors could vote. Some journalists could remain, but only with associate, non-voting status. This CIA coup was followed in 1953 by the expulsion from IAPA of members with "pro-communist" tendencies. One of the chief inquisitors was James B. Canel.

IAPA's stock theme is to warn that "freedom of the press" is threatened in whichever corner of the world U.S. influence is on the decline. Concurrently, IAPA elevates to its board of directors the publisher of whatever CIA media outlets exist in any "threatened" country. James B. Canel began his journalism career as editor of the *Havana Post*. In his view, there was plenty of freedom of the press in Cuba under the Machado and Batista dictatorships. But in 1959 Canel was already an IAPA executive and spent the following year telling the world that Fidel Castro was a threat to freedom of the press.

Similarly, as the crisis over Chile loomed, four El Mercurio executives were elevated to the IAPA board—Agustin Edwards, Hernan Cubillos, Rene Silva Espejo, and Fernando Leniz. Edwards, as noted above, had been a CIA agent since 1958. Cubillos was identified in the October 23, 1978 Los Angeles Times as "one of the CIA's principal agents." Cubillos, who was Edwards' attorney as well as assistant, is now Foreign Minister of Chile; after the coup, many El Mercurio executives entered the junta government. This information had been leaked from the trial of former ITT official Robert Berrellez, who, with Harold

Hendrix, another ITT official, was being prosecuted for perjury before the Church Committee during its investigation of the role of ITT and the CIA in Chile. (The government's indictment admitted that Berrellez and Hendrix were in frequent contact with CIA officer Jonathan Hanke in attempts to thwart the Senate hearings; and according to an October 23, 1978 Washington Post article, there were hints that numerous other CIA officers, career men like William Broe, Henry Hecksher, Ted Shackley, Tom Polgar and Jacob Esterline, may also have been involved in those attempts.)

After the trial commenced, both Berrellez and Hendrix then appeared on the staff of the Miami Herald. The CIA apparently justifies its domestic media activities such as those at the Miami Herald and with the Copley papers in San Diego, California, because both cities are used as bases for Agency operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.

After the death of James Copley in 1973, CIA representation in the Copley organization and in his IAPA slot was maintained by William B. Giandoni and Victor H. Krulak. Giandoni was identified as a CIA media asset in the Trento and Roman expose mentioned above. He was Copley's Latin America editor, and is now the general manager. He received the IAPA "Freedom of the Press" award in 1975, while a member of the IAPA Freedom of the Press Committee and its board of directors. "Butch" Krulak was until 1976 vice-president and director of Copley and an IAPA board member. Previously he had served as a Marine Lieutenant-General in Vietnam. Other Copley staff who have worked directly for the CIA or under the direction of CIA media executives include Ed Christopherson and John Philip Sousa.

Christopherson was identified as a CIA operative by the New York Times on December 27, 1977, and was intimately connected with the Agency's operations in Chile after the fascist coup. Sousa, grandson of the composer of military marches, writes whatever patriotic themes Giandoni tells him to. In 1976 Congressmen Harkins, Miller and Moffett went to Chile to investigate human rights conditions. In anticipation of a critical report, Copley News Service sent Sousa to Santiago to produce pre-junta articles. His first piece was reprinted in the February 4, 1976 Times of the Americas, in the February American-Chilean Council Bulletin, and was introduced into the March 31 Congressional Record by Larry McDonald, right-wing activist and Congressman from Georgia.

Other CIA agents at El Mercurio with IAPA connections include Tomas P. McHale, a member of the IAPA Freedom of the Press Committee, and Enrique Campos Menendez, a former IAPA board member. Both are Chileans.


The Daily Gleaner and IAPA

The marriage between the *Daily Gleaner* and IAPA extends back at least to 1968. In the ensuing decade, IAPA bestowed scholarships upon a large number of *Gleaner*

staff people for study in the U.S., many at Columbia University School of Journalism, which also administers the Cabot prize. Consistent with the pattern of CIA-inspired destabilization efforts against the Jamaican government, especially beginning in late 1975, Oliver Clarke, Daily Gleaner chairman and managing director, was duly promoted in 1976 to IAPA Executive Committee membership. The scale of anti-Manley propaganda in the Gleaner's pages escalated sharply.

In September 1970 the CIA, in the person of Agustin Edwards, prepared a 24-page background brief for *Time* magazine to use in its coverage on Allende's election victory and, according to the CIA, "the basic thrust and timing [of the *Time* story] were changed as a result of the briefing." (Church Committee report, "Covert Action," April 1976, p. 14.) The main themes were repeated in the IAPA newsletter over the next four years!

In September 1970 the specific theme which the CIA had James Canel push through IAPA was "the threat to the free press in Chile." The principal themes, in order of frequency, were: Allende's threat to *El Mercurio*; Chile's links to Cuba; and economic failure and collapse in Chile, as in Cuba.



It is not difficult for anyone following the Gleaner's pages over the past few years to see the striking, direct parallels. The same themes are still being used; the Manley government's threat to freedom of the press (as personified by the Gleaner, of course), the links between Manley and Cuba, and the economic difficulties of the Jamaican economy. The analogies are sobering, given the brutal fascism which has held sway in Chile the past six years.

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ROBERT MOSS

By Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch

"You Cannot Hope to Bribe or Twist,
Thank God, the British Journalist,
For Seeing What the Man Will Do
Unbribed, There's No Occasion To."

Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch are correspondents of Peoples News Service, London. Their articles, individually and jointly, have appeared in many newspapers in the United Kingdom and around the world. Mr. Bloch is also the co-author of a new book on the British influence in Africa to be published next year by Pluto Press.

Robert Moss is perhaps one of the most influential rightwing commentators in politics today. From Australia like many successful journalists in Britain, he is the son of an Australian Military Intelligence officer, something reflected in his messianic activities on behalf of the "free world." However, little is known about the man's career in Britain, and overseas readers of his material know still less.

The talent-spotters of the right in Britain must have seen promise in him from his writings for the weekly magazine often thought of as the authoritative voice of British big business, the *Economist*. He has edited for many years the "confidential" supplement to the Economist, the Foreign Report. In advertisements sent to selected individuals (prospective subscribers have to provide copious details on themselves and an undertaking to keep confidential the contents of the Foreign Report) they have said, "Foreign Report was unique in that it forecast almost to the day the coup d'etat in Greece in 1967 and the coup in Chile in 1973.... "It does not take too much imagination to realize where this information most probably originated. It also "revealed the new postings of top KGB men and widening web of Soviet block (sic) intelligence." Foreign Report is interesting reading for fans of unreconstructed conspiracy theories and reads like a gossip column of the intelligence world. If one takes a straw poll of Robert Moss's bestknown writings, it is plain to see that intelligence sources have provided him with the raw material on which he has based much of his reputation. A secret department of the Foreign Office called the Information Research Department, whose purpose was to spread cold war propaganda, published material in various newspapers before closing down in 1977. A source who worked at IRD told us that several IRD articles had been contributed to Foreign Report.

A story of Moss's in October 1975 on the illegitimate use of computers exported to the East implied intimate knowledge of Russian office work in their secret police. In January 1977 his vast series on the South African invasion of Angola made little secret of consultation with the South African military and intelligence establishment, as well as the CIA. In March, the "Club of Ten," a secretly-financed South African government front organization, published a full page advertisement in the Guardian reprinting part of Moss's article and urging all to read the article for its expose of "Soviet expansionism" in Africa. Earlier, Moss had been on a visit to the areas controlled by UNITA in the Angolan war, but on his return failed to mention in his written material that UNITA was supported primarily by the South African military.

The South African government publication, South African Digest, has reprinted several Moss articles. This year alone, Moss has treated the British public to Russian designs on Iran (in January), familiarity with the training of the "East Germany spy seducers" (in March) and most recently, a "secret CIA report" which "came into his hands" in August, which he has followed up in September with the "exposure" of the Cuban ambassador to Jamaica as an intelligence agent. These are but a sample of the kind of material which has made Moss so popular with editors all over the world. These authors have seen his material reprinted in the USA, West Germany, Holland, France and Jamaica, little doubting that this is but a small sample of the coverage the man receives.

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But this should not be too surprising. After all, Moss is extremely articulate and writes a lively, committed prose. What it is committed to, however, is less attractive.

One can gain some perspective on these literary achievements by looking at his output in the early seventies. Having acted as the Economist correspondent in Chile. Moss has written a book called Chile's Marxist Experiment. This was commissioned by the third world news agency for which he had long written, Forum World Features. Headed by a long time political associate of Moss's and fellow Australian Brian Crozier, who was the previous editor of Foreign Report, Forum was disbanded in late 1975 when knowledge of its forthcoming exposure was obtained. Forum, it turned out, had been set up and financed by the CIA and was run with the "knowledge and co-operation" of British intelligence.



The Chilean military junta bought 9,750 copies of Moss's book for distribution through its embassies. Some bemused US citizens received three copies of the book in one package, at no charge. The book was published in Spanish by the Chilean state firm Mistral, which was run by Tomas P. McHale, who also ran the "Institute for General Studies," once three-quarters financed by the CIA. Before the military coup, Moss wrote an article for a CIAfunded Chilean magazine aimed specifically at army officers, Sepa. The article was called, "An English Recipe for Chile-Military Control." Attempts to document covert involvement of the CIA with the publication of Chile's Marxist Experiment have met great obstacles. When US Representative Don Edwards brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act on this question, he was met with an affidavit from the Information Review Officer for the Directorate of Operations which insisted that the existence or non-existence of any involvement with the book "must remain secret. Therefore, I must emphasize that the Central Intelligence Agency can neither confirm nor deny that there was, in fact, any CIA involvement with the book, Chile's Marxist Experiment."

Never too distant politically from the military in general, Moss has had other contributions to make in Latin America. Eight months after the rightist coup in Argentina in 1976 Moss spoke at an Air Force base praising the Argentine armed forces. He told the officers that they had the opportunity to construct a "national political model" that could serve as an example to the rest of Latin America. Argentina has one of the highest levels of state-sponsored political murders in the world.

Three years ago Moss stated, "I make no secret of my views, and I think that the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies are a vital part of resisting Soviet expansion and therefore cannot be reviewed in the same light as the KGB, but that does not mean that I would accept money from them." Those that have made any such suggestions have been quickly met with libel actions and in every case, either damages or apologies have resulted. These people have forgotten the usefulness of the quotation at the start of this article. Moss believes quite genuinely in what he writes and does not do it because other agencies tell him to.

It is difficult to say whether Moss would resist the epithet of "ideologue," but in all the organizations with which he has been associated, he has been in the company of the most fervent propagandists against the Soviet Union, against abortion, for more military spending, against trade union power, against left wingers in academics, in favor of the death penalty, and so on.

One of his platforms has been the Institute for the Study of Conflict. Headed by Brian Crozier, it was started in 1970 while Crozier was still in charge of Forum, mostly with funds from companies like Shell and BP, some US corporations, the US National Strategy Information Centre and with Forum money. The NSIC is supported by the Mellon family, heirs of the Gulf Oil fortune, and continues its connections with the Institute. Richard Mellon Scaife took over ownership of Forum World Features from John Hay Whitney, who was once titular controller of the CIA-run news service.

The ISC was set up to study urban terrorism, guerrilla warfare and related subjects. Its Council members include numerous people with intelligence connections, some more official than others. Vice-Admiral Louis Le Bailly was Director-General of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence, 1972-5. Richard Clutterbuck, lecturer in politics and a former Major-General, is regarded as one of those principally responsible for the British Army's counterinsurgency tactics in Northern Ireland. Sir Robert Thompson was once one of President Nixon's favorite advisers and the author of the "strategic hamlets" concept of counter-insurgency war which he implemented in Malaya on behalf of the British Army. Another Council member is Sir Edward Peck, once head of the Secret Intelligence Service (British intelligence) clandestine operations in Berlin. Further examples can easily be drawn from the ISC's long list of contributors, all the way from coldwar academics to former SIS employees. Moss has written five "Conflict Studies" for the ISC, his most recent one being "The Campaign to Destabilise Iran," a work which sees the hand of the KGB in the militancy of the

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Ayatollahs.

So notorious is the ISC, not merely because of the persistent exposure of its activities by the left, but also because of caution over its intelligence connections by members of the respectable academic establishment, that its credibility is strained. The London Guardian reported that in just one year, 1973, according to Church Committee sources, ISC received three-fourths of its funds from the CIA. Not so the other organization from whose mast Moss has chosen to fly his colors, the National Association for Freedom.

NAFF was certainly a crowning success in Moss's career and an organization of great importance in British political life during the years 1974 to 1977. That period marked the heyday of its activities when, in fighting legislation concerning trade unions in the courts, by-passing boycotts by trade unions and urging greater militancy from the right wing, it succeeded in rallying to the banner of "freedom" large sections of the Conservative Party. They managed to galvanise the previously apathetic right into a level of political activity it had not been involved in for many years. Responsible observers believe that it played a significant role in stimulating the Conservative Party to elect Margaret Thatcher as Leader. It may not seem so now, but in 1974 she represented all the aspirations of the militant right wing of the Conservatives.

NAFF arose in 1974 out of a resurgence of middle-class organizations like the National Federation of the Self-Employed (small shopkeepers, independent crafts people and so on), the Middle Class Association, and others. One of the prime movers in NAFF's foundation was Ross McWhirter who in early 1975 was head of Current Affairs Press, a printing organization set up in imitation of Winston Churchill's "British Gazette" which produced bulletins when newspapers were closed down by the workers during the General Strike of 1926. CAP was supposed to be able to produce hundreds of thousands of copies of a newspaper in the event of a similar industrial stoppage or newspaper strike in the seventies. It is thought that the delays in getting NAFF off the ground may have had something to do with problems in attracting members of the respectable right into the forum. McWhirter had had associations with one of Britain's most famous fascists, Lady Birdwood, and had jointly produced a publication with her. But the final impetus which shot NAFF into the headlines on its foundation and left the neo-fascists well outside the organization, was the assassination of McWhirter by the IRA on November 27, 1975. He had published a pamphlet entitled "How to Stop The Bombers" (sic) and offered a £50,000 reward for the capture of IRA members.

NAFF's inaugural meeting was addressed by McWhirter's twin, Norris (the two are most famous as co-publishers of Guinness' Book of Records), on December 2 and instituted formally with Council members like Viscount De L'Isle, director of Phoenix Assurance, one of the largest insurance companies in Britain, and former Tory MP and millionaire, John Gouriet of Current Affairs Press, John Gorst of the Middle Class Association,

seven Tory MPs, Sir Robert Thompson (see above), and the late Sir Gerald Templer, Thompson's former chief in the British campaign to eradicate the communists in Malaya. There were also representatives of other rightwing, middle-class organizations like the National Federation of Building Trades Employers, the Independent Medical Association, the Income Tax Payers Association, the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (anti-abortion group), as well as a few Council members of the ISC. Robert Moss became its Director. Moss's star was rising fast, especially as late 1975 also saw the publication of his Orwellian treatise on the destruction of "liberty" by trade unions and Labour governments, "The Collapse of Democracy."

NAFF's campaign against what Moss called the "Sovietisation of Britain," had already started with John Gouriet's court action against the National Union of Seamen (prior to the foundation of NAFF) to release cars on a car ferry boycotted by the union in an industrial dispute. NAFF continued to gain notoriety over its defense of George Ward, the manager-owner of Grunwick, a filmprocessing factory racked by a year-long strike by immigrant workers for the recognition of their union. Several court actions by NAFF resisted the unionization of the plant. With George Ward they prevented, by means of the courts again, the post office workers' union from boycotting mail to the factory (since Grunwick is a mailorder firm, this solidarity action would have been very serious for the company). NAFF was also active in preventing the post office workers' union from boycotting mail and telecommunications with South Africa in March 1977 as part of the international trade union Week Of Action Against Apartheid. Moss's leadership of NAFF was probably one of the greatest contributors to its success and in its heyday, he was part of Margaret Thatcher's speech-writing team, and helped write her famous speech two years ago which led the Russians to dub her the "Iron Maiden" for wishing the return of the Cold War. With the consolidation of Thatcher's leadership, observers felt that the steam went out of NAFF, basically because the Conservative Party was so right wing. In November 1977 Moss gave up his position as Director of NAFF, although he remained on its Council and on the editorial board of NAFF's organ, "The Free Nation."

These days, Moss seems to be content with his regular weekly column in the Daily Telegraph and editorship of the Foreign Report. But his voice can still be heard in other parts of the world contributing to the cause of "freedom.' Several of his Daily Telegraph pieces have appeared in the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica, a paper now subject to an enquiry into allegedly "unprofessional and unethical" practices and accused of conducting a "disinformation" campaign in its pages to oppose Prime Minister Michael Manley. Moss's article "exposing" the new ambassador, Ulises Estrada, as an intelligence agent sparked demonstrations and calls for Estrada's expulsion. Recently, many Jamaicans have been asking, "Who is this mysterious Robert Moss?" One week after the appearance of Moss's article, on October 22, the Gleaner published a photograph and obituary of a Jamaican man. Robert Moss, "an agriculturalist." It seems that a factual account of Moss's career is feared by the promoters of his material.

Robert Moss' Obsession By Philip Agee

Something was odd that cold and rainy October day in London five years ago when, at my first press conference, I distributed a statement about the CIA's work in Mexico and a list of CIA personnel there. I'd invited all the London press corps, and just as the conference was to begin a slight, youngish man took one of the chairs at the table from which I was going to speak. He seemed tense and nervous as he placed a microphone and tape recorder in front of me.

But the atmosphere in the Old Bell tavern was informal enough that a journalist sitting at the speaker's table instead of in the chairs arranged for the audience wasn't so out-of-place. Later he asked a number of questions in a hostile manner, and afterwards a friendly journalist asked me if I knew who that man at the table was. I didn't and he said it was Robert Moss, a far right political journalist who had written articles against the Allende government in Chile.

Of course. I knew Moss but I didn't know his politics. In recent weeks he had sent me two telegrams asking me to do a "major interview" that he would combine with a review of "Inside the Company" for Vision, the widely circulated Sparish language news magazine. At the time, Moss was editor of the magazine, in which the then president of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, had a financial interest. He said ne was "eager," "anxious" and "grateful" and that the interview would be one of a series including such famed writers as Gabriel Garcia Marquez and J.K. Galbraith. He even offered me a fee of 100 pounds plus all expenses for travelling to London from my home in Cornwall. We had also had a pleasant enough conversation by telephone, and I had agreed to send him a set of page proofs for the review because the book was not yet ready.

I was doing interviews with scores of media people then, but the contrast between Moss' hostility at the press conference and his friendly, almost suppliant, approach only days before made me wonder. I asked Garcia Marquez abour Moss, and he confirmed he'd done the interview—but only with written questions and answers. He knew who Moss was and hadn't taken any chances. So I told Moss' secretary by telephone to send me the questions and I would send the answers back in writing. I never got the questions, but in the years that followed I got a lot of Robert Moss.

With no purposeful effort on my part, I somehow became Moss' own cherished bete noire, an apparent obsession from which article after article flowed suggesting, perhaps to some readers, that I might be the greatest threat to Western Civilization since Genghis Khan.



Robert Moss

For Moss I am an "ideological defector"—"the CIA man-turned-Marxist" who runs worldwide operations to discredit western security services. "The Agee crowd," he writes solemnly, is working "to undermine the internal defenses of western societies against an aggressive superpower, and to seek to blacken the names of those individuals and private organizations who are working most effectively to defend what is left of the free world."

International conspiracy, in the 1950s mold, seems to be Moss' mind-frame. He tends to throw together all sorts of names and organizations from his enemies list in an effort to link disparate activities. He has often, for example, tried to connect my work against the CIA's secret operations with totally unrelated work of the Transnational Institute, the Institute for Policy Studies, and other individuals and movements seeking to curb abuses by intelligence services in western countries. And he implies often enough that communist intelligence services are lurking somewhere in the background pulling my strings.

But for the fact that some people might believe him, his preaching would be ludicrous—and indeed I've enjoyed no little amusement reading his alarmist and weighty attacks. Yet he reaches millions of readers in the London Daily Telegraph, in other countries such as Jamaica, and even in the U.S. Congressional Record where sympathetic Congresspeople have placed his articles. As editor of the Economist magazine's "Foreign Report," Moss also reaches many other journalists and editorial writers the world over.

Sometimes, when I read his articles naming communist diplomats in different countries as intelligence operatives, I am truly amazed at the breadth of his sources. Yet I wonder if it isn't more likely that he gets his information neatly spoonfed from the CIA, British intelligence and other interested security services. And his articles about me have set me wondering still more about who's giving him information.

Take, for example, the suggestion in several articles that I was "compromised" by the KGB while still a CIA officer because I met a Soviet diplomat names Semenov in Uruguay in 1964. I did in fact meet a Soviet Embassy First Secretary named Semenov in 1964, and I mentioned him in "Inside the Company" as one of several Russians I saw

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from time to time at the CIA's direction. Our interest in him was to discover whether he was a straight diplomat or a KGB officer, since he was on his first foreign assignment and we had no previous information on him. When I left Uruguay in 1966 we still didn't know his true affiliation.

Yet "Foreign Report" in 1977, under the headline "Agee's Soviet Contact," comes up with a remarkable scoop. "Former CIA officials believe that Philip Agee established a significant contact with Soviet intelligence back in October 1964 when he was still working for the CIA. It was then that he first encountered Vassiliy Semenov in Montevideo. Semenov was a senior KGB officer who was then working under cover as a military attache. "Cleverly, "Foreign Report" failed to mention that I myself had written of knowing Semenov and other Soviets, including known KGB officers, and that the CIA had lengthy memoranda on my conversations with them. "Foreign Report" also got Semenov's diplomatic title wrong as well as the date I first met him.

The article goes on to allege that Semenov was posted in Havana when I was there, presumably in 1971, and that he traveled to Moscow when I was there "two years ago" to edit the Russian edition of my book. In fact my trip to Moscow was less than a year before the article.

Then Moss, writing in the Daily Telegraph in 1978, placed Semenov in Madrid, adding, "It would not be surprising to find the ex-CIA man winging his way south to Spain." Moss apparently knew that I had just made a trip to Spain, well-publicized in the Spanish media, to promote the Spanish edition of "Inside the Company"—arrangements made by telephone several weeks before Moss' article. Of course, what he should also know is that I have not seen Semenov since I left Uruguay in 1966, and I have no idea whether he was or was not a legitimate diplomat.

Distortion and error with the Semenov allegation is only one of many examples. In November 1978, after two years of expulsions and similar troubles in six NATO countries, I finally received residence permission in West Germany. But from my arrival in May until November 14 I didn't know whether I would be allowed to stay. In a telephone conversation that day the police told my lawyer that they were reversing their earlier decision to refuse my application. Yet on November 15, the very day I received my permit, "Foreign Report" came out with an article on my new residence status in Hamburg. And then, within days, Moss published articles in the Daily Telegraph and the right-wing German press, allegedly the findings of a recent trip to Hamburg. The articles were so full of errors and distortions that Die Welt (under my threat of a lawsuit) published some 300 words of my corrections.

One such error was that in September 1978 I had "contacted" the Cuban intelligence service. Moss wrote that the "contact" was a supposed DGI officer named Martinez who was working in the Cuban Embassy in Bonn. In fact, the previous June, a Cuban Embassy official named Martinez had telephoned me from Bonn to arranged elivery to me in Hamburg of an invitation to the XI World Youth Festival to begin the following month in Havana.

I never saw Martinez again, but at the Festival I arranged to return to Havana in September to help prepare a memoire on the Festival. But I could not return as agreed, so in September I telephoned the Cuban Embassy to ask Martinez if he could so advise the Festival Committee in Havana. He was not in, so I left a message and never spoke to him. Quite clearly someone with access to transcripts of telephone calls told Moss of the call, which was converted to a "contact" with the Cuban DGI, omitting, of course, the substance of the message, but adding the ominous claim that Martinez was an intelligence officer, something which was most likely another of Moss' convenient conclusions.

In his December 1978 Die Welt article, Moss had me coming to Germany from Holland when in fact I came from Switzerland, and as usual when writing of me, he was seeing red. He had me living in the Redtree district of Hamburg (true), in a red house (false), owned by a former lawyer of the red army faction (false), whose current activities he went on to describe, as if somehow related to me. And in the Daily Telegraph at the same time Moss made much of my marriage in March 1978 to an American ballerina resident in West Germany, suggesting that it was "a convenient marriage if not a marriage of convenience." He wrote that my wife's German residence permit and ballet contract dated from after our marriage, as if to suggest that it was a ruse to get me residence in Germany, whereas in reality she had been working under contract in Germany since 1975. He also said that I came to Hamburg in the Fall of 1978 "soon after" my wife's arrival, when in fact I came in May and she had lived in Hamburg for several years. And instead of using my wife's stage name (her mother's) which appeared in her contract, Moss referred to her by her father's name which could only be found in her passport or in our Amsterdam marriage records—copies of which were taken from her by Frankfurt airport police when she arrived back in Germany on the day we were married.

Then, Moss went on to state that I had had "numerous contacts with Soviet intelligence in the past"—suggesting that the contacts are current rather than years ago and at the CIA's direction, and neglecting to point out that I had described all of these contacts in my book.

And so it goes from article to article. I have little doubt where Moss gets his "inside" information, and the purpose behind his distortions is only too clear. Yet in the end, his kind of deceptive, obsessive, Cold War political journalism only subverts the "free" media institutions that one would think he is out to defend. Even the London Spectator questioned the Daily Telegraph's wisdom in giving Moss so much space to attack me, observing that "much of Moss' information comes from government sources," that his articles "read as though they were based on security files," and that "government security agencies are not interested in publishing information unless it serves their purposes." The Spectator's putdown concluded: "Moss does succeed in presenting Agee as a rather sinister figure, but only by suggesting that Mr. Agee is a mirror image of Mr. Moss.... But should the Daily Telegraph accommodate (the security service and Moss)? At least the special supplements in the Times can be extracted and thrown away."

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CIA COVERT PROPAGANDA CAPABILITY

By Sean Gervasi

Sean Gervasi is an economist and author and expert on African affairs This article is one chapter of a lengthy work in progress.

The series of articles on CIA media activities published in *The New York Times* at the end of 1977 gave some indication of the Agency's global reach. It revealed that an extensive network of assets had been established for carrying out covert propaganda around the world. Unfortunately, however, the *Times* articles were impressionistic rather than systematic. They contained much valuable information. But the wealth of detail was essentially unconnected and incoherent. The articles did not provide any clear account of covert propaganda operations as a whole.

The principal flaw of the series, which received relatively little attention, was that it left readers with almost no idea of the overall scale of CIA media activities. In this article, a rough estimate of CIA covert propaganda capability will be made. Such an estimate is essential if we are to begin to analyze the problems posed by covert propaganda within the present global information order.

The Central Intelligence Agency does not publish figures which would help to shed light on its capabilities in the sphere of propaganda. Nonetheless, information which has become available in the course of Congressional investigations and private research can provide the basis for a tentative estimate of the amount of expenditure on covert propaganda and of the number of people engaged in that activity.

The starting point for any such estimate must be the size of the current overall CIA budget.

The official figure for total CIA expenditure, of course, remains a secret, even to the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, there is enough fragmentary evidence available to permit a reasonable estimate. In their book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, Victor Marchetti and John Marks gave a figure of \$750 million for the CIA budget. That figure may be taken to refer to the year 1973, the year before the publication of the book.

The Marchetti and Marks figure is a useful benchmark. It is thought by many observers to underestimate CIA expenditures at the time. Nonetheless, it comes from a knowledgeable source and may be taken as a reliable indica-

tion of the order of magnitude of total CIA expenditure five years ago.

Recent well-informed estimates place the current figure at approximately \$1 billion. The National Journal, for instance, a respected Washington weekly on politics and government, indicated at the end of 1977 that the CIA budget was "only slightly less than \$1 billion." This figure is within the range of the Marchetti and Marks estimate. Average annual increases of 5 percent added to their 1973 figure would give a 1978 budget total of some \$940 million.

It must be kept in mind, however, that these are all public estimates and that informed sources are, for a variety of reasons, likely to understate estimates given for publication or attribution.

Sources within and near the intelligence community indicate that the actual current figures are substantially higher. One Washington source with extensive knowledge of the CIA's operations recently indicated that \$1.5 billion should be considered a "reasonable" estimate for total expenditure. A second source close to the intelligence community stated that such a figure is too low and that \$2 billion is more appropriate.

Thus the range of estimates for current total expenditure by the CIA is from \$1 billion to \$2 billion. This is the same range given by Philip Agee in his most recent book. After an examination of the fragmentary evidence on expenditure from Congressional investigations, Agee concluded that "the CIA would be spending between \$1 billion and \$2 billion depending on whether one takes the combined national, tactical and indirect support costs as the total (\$22.4 billion), or simply the national program (\$11.2 billion) as the total."

Thus, when the available evidence is taken into account, it would appear that \$1.5 billion is a reasonable estimate for CIA total expenditure in 1978.

The next step in estimating covert propaganda capability is to break down the budget total into various kinds of expenditure. The Central Intelligence Agency is organized around four directorates: Operations, Administration, National Intelligence, and Science and Technology. Table A shows how expenditures are divided among the four different directorates and, within each directorate, how they are divided by function. The breakdown is based upon a similar one given by Marchetti and Marks for 1973.

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Table A

ESTIMATED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BUDGET: 1978

Office of the Director	\$20 million
Directorate for Operations Espionage/Counterespionage Covert Action	\$880 million (\$360 million) (\$520 million)
Directorate for Administration Communications Other Support	\$220 million (\$80 million) (\$140 million)
Directorate for National Intelligence Analysis Information Processing	\$140 million (\$100 million) (\$40 million)
Directorate for Science and Technology Technical Collection Research and Development	\$240 million (\$100 million) (\$140 million)

TOTAL \$1.5 billion

1. Previously known as the Directorate of Management and Services.

Table A is really an expansion of the Marchetti and Marks table. The overall budget figure is doubled, and the separate figures for each directorate and function are doubled. Thus the main assumption is that the structure of activities within the CIA remains what it was five years ago. Each activity is assumed to account for the same proportion of total expenditure today that it accounted for in 1973. This seems a valid assumption. Reductions in operations due to the withdrawal from Indochina have in all probability been compensated for by increases in activity and expenditure in other areas such as Central America and the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf and southern Africa.

For the purposes of the present inquiry the important figure in Table A is the \$520 million spent in the Directorate for Operations on covert action. For covert propaganda is one of the principal covert activities carried out by the CIA. The other two principal covert activities are political action and paramilitary. Thus the detailed breakdown of the overall budget estimate helps us to begin to isolate covert propaganda activities and to make a rough estimate of their dollar cost.


At this stage one might estimate expenditure on covert propaganda anywhere from 15 to 40 percent of the total for covert action, that is, at between \$75 million and \$200 million. Such an estimate would appear to be consistent with the notion that covert propaganda is one of three important activities in a covert action program costing more than \$500 million. This would be a very crude estimate, but certainly better than nothing.

It is possible, however, to be rather more precise, for there are fragments of evidence which give fairly clear indication of the relative importance of propaganda in the Agency's covert action programs. The Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 stated: "Some 29 percent of 40 Committee-approved covert actions were for media and propaganda projects... This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects could be determined it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA"

The Committee stated further that the expenditure on political action, or Election Support, was, for the period examined, 32 percent of the total expended for covert action.

Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that, when all covert action authorizations are taken into account, it is likely that covert propaganda accounts for one-third of the total for covert action. This means that, with a budget of some \$520 million for covert action, the CIA was probably spending some \$170 to \$175 million for covert propaganda within the Directorate for Operations in 1978.

These costs would be only the direct expenses, however. They would not include the support or indirect costs of covert propaganda activities. The indirect costs could be estimated by adding an appropriate proportion of the total costs incurred by the two supporting directorates of the CIA, those for Administration and for Science and Technology. These directorates provide support for all Agency operations, support without which operations would be impossible. Adding indirect costs means no more than adding the costs of additional activities which are necessary for support of covert propaganda.



The estimated total expenditure by the Directorates for Administration and for Science and Technology in 1978 was \$460 million. Some \$270 million, or 60 percent of that sum, is allocable to covert action support. One-third of that \$270 million, or \$90 million, could be considered the indirect cost of covert propaganda.

The reasoning behind the allocation of such a sum to support of covert propaganda is based upon a fundamental distinction between operations and those activities which support them. The purposes of the Central Intelligence

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Agency, in essence, are to gather intelligence and to carry out operations. Other activities support those efforts. Basically, the Directorate for National Intelligence supports intelligence-gathering activities in the Directorate for Operations. The two other Directorates support all Agency activities. Thus 60 percent of the expenditure by Administration and by Science and Technology may be allocated to support of covert action, which spends 60 percent of all Operations funds. This is the reasoning behind the allocation of \$270 as the indirect costs of covert action. The last logical step is to allocate one-third of that amount to the support of covert propaganda.

Thus the total cost of covert propaganda in 1978 was probably in the range of \$265 million, that is, \$175 million in direct expenditure plus a further \$90 million in support costs.

Estimates of the number of personnel employed in covert propaganda activities are more difficult to make. In 1974 Marchetti and Marks estimated that the total of CIA salaried employees was 16,500. Of that number they estimated that 6,000 were employed in the Directorate for Operations. The total number of CIA employees, however, is believed by informed sources to be substantially larger. The lowest estimate cited currently is 20,000. If it is assumed that personnel are allocated to different functions in the same proportions as expenditure, then this figure suggests that 12,000 people are currently employed in the Directorate for Operations. Of that number 7,200 would be employed in covert action programs, and 2,400 would be employed in covert propaganda.

For a variety of reasons, this estimate has been reduced to 2,000 salaried employees in covert propaganda. In addition, of course, one would have to add some 1,000 contract employees, most of whom are employed overseas, who constitute the "media assets" of the covert propaganda program. Thus some 3,000 salaried and contract employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are likely to be currently engaged in various clandestine media activities designed to influence world opinion.

These figures must be seen in perspective. Table B gives data on the budgets and size of the largest of the world's news agencies. It can be seen that the Central Intelligence Agency uses far more resources in its propaganda operations than any single news agency uses in gathering and

disseminating news around the world. In fact, the CIA propaganda budget is as large as the combined budgets of Reuters, United Press International and the Associated Press. The Agency, furthermore, appears to employ as many, if not more, personnel than any single news agency.

TABLE B

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES AND C.I.A. PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS BY SIZE MID-1970s

Agency	Turnover/ Expenditure	Personnel Total	Corre- spondents Overseas
Reuters	\$80 m.	2,000	350
$U.P.I.^2$	\$75 m.	1,823	578
$A.P.^3$	\$100+ m.	n.a.	559
T.A.S.S.4	n.a.	560°	61
A.F.P.5	n.a.	1.990b	171
C.I.A. propaganda ⁶	\$265 m.	2,000	1,0007

- 1. All data are from the chapter on the Reuters Agency in International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, 15, Monographs (III), pp. 113-123, U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1978.
- 2. All data are from the chapter on United Press International, op. cit., pp. 147-163.
- 3. All data are from the chapter on the Associated Press, I.C.S.C.P., 13, Monographs (1), pp. 19-28.
- 4. All data are from the chapter on T.A.S.S. in I.C.S.C.P., 15. Monographs (III), pp. 138-146.
- 5. All data are from the chapter on Agence France Press, I.C.S.C.P., 13, Monographs (1), pp. 2-10.
- 6. Estimates by the author explained in the text.
- 7. It is estimated that there are more than 1,000 individuals and news organizations in the "media assets inventory".
- a. Domestic and foreign correspondents only.
- b. Professional staff only.

It must be realized, of course, that these comparisons are very rough ones. For the estimates of the CIA's propaganda activities are approximate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the CIA's propaganda capability is formidable. The Agency, in fact, may be considered the largest "news" organization in the world.

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CIA Relations with Media— Official and Otherwise

It is clear that one of the most sensitive areas in government is the use by the CIA of media and of reporters as spies "in the national interest." As the CIA is supplying certain information to reporters in the U.S., even at their own request, it should not be forgotten that it is specifically forbidden from engaging in domestic propaganda activity by the 1947 National Security Act.

Nonetheless, the CIA has with impunity violated this part of its charter. It was exposed again and again during the Church Committee hearings which traced the pattern back many years; by Carl Bernstein in the October 1977 Rolling Stone, who asserted that about 400 American media people secretly collaborated with the Agency; and by the New York Times on December 27 and 28, 1977 which revealed operational assistance to the CIA rendered over the years by various editors and journalists whom it named.

The CIA has used major U.S. news organizations as cover for its officers. It has paid editors, reporters, columnists, commentators, and free-lancers for their intelligence favors. It has owned or funded over fifty news organizations. And it has sponsored, subsidized or produced more than 1,000 books (about one-fourth of them in English).

Getting Briefed by the CIA

One of the ways in which the CIA exploits media personnel is characterized in an internal Agency regulation dated November 30, 1977 which sanctions the maintenance of "regular liaison with representatives of the news media." How does this process work? Take the case of journalists whose beat is foreign or military affairs, and who periodically travel to Headquarters in Langley. There they sit down with Herbert E. Hetu, the chief CIA spokesperson, or his representative, and receive a "substantive" briefing on some topic. Normally, the briefings are "on background," meaning the information they receive can only be described as deriving from "a government official" or some such label, but can not be attributed to the CIA.

These sessions are, by the admission of the journalists, entered into on their own initiative—a fact which is the CIA's automatic justification of the program. Many observers question the propriety of these liaison activities, both from the standpoint of the CIA and of the journalists who choose the Agency as a news source, particularly when the source is not CIA-attributed, which it rarely is.

The "voluntary" nature of the journalist's relationship with the CIA under such circumstances does not preclude the possibility that it is the CIA which receives the briefing and the journalists who gives it. Some are proud to say they have briefed the Agency.

CAIB has learned that a few chosen journalists in the U.S. receive briefings from the CIA, in printed form, delivered to them by courier, and known to contain a mixture of classified and non-classified material. Our source informed us that in some instances, recipients of these printed briefings have simply put their own by-line on the stories, which are printed almost verbatim by their newspaper.

The best known case of this kind is that of C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times foreign affairs correspondent. According to an intelligence agency source quoted by Carl Bernstein, Sulzberger was provided with a "background paper" and then "gave it to the printers and put his name on it." Even though he acknowledged knowing every CIA director personally since Allen Dulles, Sulzberger denied the incident.

Sowing Seeds on Foreign Soil

Another sensitive area is the CIA's admitted liaison with foreign journalists. It is quite apparent this is a field where the Agency remains tenaciously unyielding to any proposed change or reform. In his 1978 reply to one journalist who challenged the practice, Admiral Stansfield Turner commented that because of "the knowledgeability of media people through their many contacts, foreign media people can be of great value to our intelligence activities." Another letter from Turner boldly claimed that to expand restrictions on the use of journalists "beyond U.S. media organizations is neither legally required nor otherwise appropriate."

Many journalists, U.S. and foreign, have expressed strong opposition to this practice. Gilbert Cranberg, editorial page editor of the *Des Moines Register-Tribune*, testified before the House Intelligence Committee in January 1978 that the CIA "should be required to quit planting false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to protect all readers from misinformation."

CIA case officers posted abroad under diplomatic cover at U.S. embassies often contact American and foreign journalists at cocktail parties, diplomatic receptions, or over a private lunch together, to discuss matters of common interest. In cases where the particular individual has been tested by the CIA for reliability over a period of time, he or she may be compensated in the form of an occasional tip which can then be converted into a news "scoop."

One of the primary methods the CIA employs is fabrication and orchestration of propaganda as a central part in any covert operation. The Church Committee Final Report (Book I, page 200) cites a portion of a CIA cable dated

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September 25, 1970, which was used as part of the Agency's dedicated efforts to discredit Salvador Allende's election: "Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in New York Times and Washington Post. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile develorments along our theme guidance."



Intelligence Community Pow-wows

As with the media, or in major corporations, much of the battle on the Washington intelligence front is fought in the ways the public relations machinery handles the public on a day-to-day basis. How does the Director of Central Intelligence superintend the "public relations" of the intelligence community? The DCI convenes periodic "working lunches" for the PR officers from throughout the "community." The agenda is of course set by the CIA, and it varies from lunch to lunch. Essentially, the aim of these CIA-controlled gatherings is to make sure the various PR people are in line and that all pull together. At one of the recent sessions, there were representatives from the following agencies in attendance:

White House—one person; Vice President's Office—one person; Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—two persons each; Drug Enforcement Agency and Department of Energy—one person each; Central Intelligence Agency—ten persons.

All participating agencies (plus the National Security Agency and the intelligence arms of the three military services—whose absence is somewhat surprising) handle large amounts of classified intelligence every day, and each is accessible to a greater or lesser degree to the various media. The DCI's "line" on the relations between the intelligence "community" and the media/public is handed down at the meetings.

The Nitty-Gritty

The House Select Intelligence Committee held hearings on the CIA and the media between December 1977 and April 1978. Its final report contained three pages of categories (pp.335-7) developed by subcommittee staff members which described, according to Committee chief counsel Michael J. O'Neill, "what the relationships could be" between the Agency and the media. He asserted that the outline, which was displayed on charts during the hearings, should not be construed as portraying the actual relationships.

Nevertheless, the wealth of information which has emerged about CIA media operations in all the Congressional hearings and from persons who have worked in exposing the intelligence network, somehow add up to a picture very close indeed to the one set forth on the charts which we reprint below:

PEOPLE

American Media

- full and part-time accredited journalists
- stringers
- non-journalist staff employees
- · editors, media policy makers
- free lancers

Foreign Media

ACTIVITIES

Information

- story confirmation
- information swapping
- pre-briefing
- debriefing
- · access to files/outtakes
- prior tasking of intelligence collection

Support

- host parties
- provide safehouses
- act as courier

Agent work

- spotting
- assessing
- recruiting
- handling

Propaganda

BONDS OF ASSOCIATION

Voluntary association ("contact"), based on:

- patriotism
- friendship ties
- career advancement (getting a scoop)

Salaried association ("assets") based on:

- gifts
- reimbursement for expenses
- regular financial payment

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THE CIA AND THE MEDIA: SOME PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

By Jim Wilcott

Jim Wilcott, a member of the Board of Advisors of CAIB, spent nine years as a finance officer with the CIA. His wife, Elsie, also worked for the Agency during that period.

During nine years of employment as an accountant with the CIA (from 1957 to 1966) I became familiar with the widespread use of the media by the CIA. Newspapers, magazines, books, radio and TV were all targets of CIA projects. This activity was by no means limited to the collecting of information by overt means: i.e., through subscriptions or assigning analysts to monitor various broadcasts, although large efforts were expended in this activity. The full range of covert action techniques for which the CIA has become so infamous were regularly used in the many media projects.

At CIA Headquarters in Washington D.C. (I was stationed there before the new Langley, Virginia complex was opened), huge rooms were filled with intelligence analysts fluent in many languages poring over domestic and foreign publications or broadcasts. Notations, name lists, copies of articles or translations of articles or broadcasts were made in areas of interest. A very complex and sophisticated system of referencing and cross-referencing using microfilm and computer facilities was employed. My assignment in the Finance Department required visits to the computer room from time to time. The RCA 501 computer that we ran our finance records through was shared by the Deputy Director of Plans division and the methods of computer-/microfilm coding were explained and shown to me. At various times displays and talks of the operational and intelligence-gathering aspects of the Agency were held. The CIA called these "county fairs." Their purpose was to acquaint CIA employees with certain aspects of the CIA that their work might not bring them in touch with. It was at one of these fairs that the microfilm-computer coding system also was displayed and explained.

In the earlier years at CIA this all seemed to me a legitimate function well within the confines of the CIA charter. In later years I was to discover the bizarre and illegal purposes this information was put to. The CIA was not only analyzing and studying the media but was also influencing and subverting the media. They were actively involved in planting articles or influencing the political content to espouse their viewpoint. In fact, these positions were sometimes at variance with official U.S. Government positions.

For instance, in Japan, the CIA took positions contrary to the then U.S. Ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer. These positions were covertly placed in the Japanese mass media by the station. On one occasion I was shown an article written by Chester Ito, a case officer in the Tokyo CIA station, which he said was to be placed in the Japan Times. The next day I read the article intact in the editorial section of the English language edition of the Japan Times. The article dealt with the docking of nuclear submarines at Japanese ports, an issue opposed by most Japanese people. In addition articles were placed in the Japanese media on the Kennedy visit in the early sixties. A campaign conducted by some religious leaders in the U.S. called "Moral Rearmament" that was covertly supported and used by the CIA toured Japan. Articles in support of this campaign were also inserted in the media.

My wife worked for a while in Internal Operations Branch during our four years at Tokyo Station. She recalls observing analysts using CIA's "Blue Book" to compose articles on Laos and civil rights, among other issues, for insertion in Japanese media. The Blue Book was issued regularly by Headquarters expressly for the purpose of providing the official CIA position for articles to be planted in the Japanese press. She also remembers CIA employees covertly associated with PEN, an international writers group, and the Asia Foundation. These are but a very few examples of Tokyo Station's involvement with the Japanese media. This activity, of course, went on all over the world as well as in the U.S.

I also heard of CIA agents infiltrated into national network news bureaus assigned to foreign countries, such as the UPI and AP Moscow news bureaus. Well known to most people now is the CIA's extensive use of the Voice of America.

At headquarters, during training for overseas assignments, we were told how CIA had covertly commissioned books to be written ostensibly by legitimate authors. CIA had also influenced, or funded, the production of movies, TV and radio programs or even theatrical productions. Many leaflets and pamphlets were also produced as the need arose in various circumstances. These as well as the media insertions could be any of three categories CIA had established—white, gray or black.

White material was basically factual and conformed to good journalistic standards, although always espousing the CIA position. Gray material was on the border line be-

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tween white and black and would contain innuendos or insinuations or partial, subtle fabrications. Black material was outright fabrications designed to malign or discredit individuals, organizations or countries felt to be inimical to CIA interests. A term we heard often in CIA was contamination. It meant that an individual or group would be discredited by guilt through association or tricked into some immoral or illegal act and then exposed in some media form. All of this required the cooperation of various individuals, a newspaper reporter or editor, etc. If voluntary cooperation for a fixed fee could not be obtained, blackmail or other nefarious methods of coercion were employed.

The media also served as excellent cover for agents to get close to various targets. An agent under cover as a magazine or newspaper reporter could interview persons deemed enemies of the CIA or potential recruits and obtain useful information in designing a project to neutralize or recruit the target. During our assignment at Headquarters a reporter on the New York Times was recruited and sent under Times cover to report on the activities of Fidel Castro in Oriente Province in 1958.

With the completion of my two tours at Tokyo Station I was assigned to Headquarters Finance. For several months I had the duty of policing domestic special payments accounts and checking the cover organization checks against our finance account balances before they were mailed in payment for services performed to various undercover agents or organizations. Many of these checks were sent to well-known newspapers or reporters, as well as unions, colleges and universities, scientific, cultural or social organizations. I specifically remember preparing checks sent to the National Student Association, for example. It was subsequently revealed in the press that NSA had been infiltrated at the highest levels by CIA.

In March of 1965 I was assigned to the Finance Division at Miami Station. A day or two prior to my arrival in Miami my boss, the Chief of Finance Robert H. Graham, was assigned by the Chief of Station the task of appearing on a Miami TV station to deny the rumor (in fact quite true) that Zenith Technical Enterprises was a cover organization for the CIA's Miami Station. He was selected since he worked mostly inside the station and would be less

subject to questioning about this fabricated denial than operational people who were more exposed to the public.

All of us on the staff at Miami Station knew of the enormous subversion and manipulation of all forms of the media that was conducted by the station. At that time the station was busy screening the Cuban refugees. Many were recruited by the CIA and trained to give completely false testimonials designed to embarrass and malign the Cuban government, its leaders and particularly Fidel Castro. CIA arranged radio, TV, newspaper and magazine interviews for these agents. Articles were commonly placed in the Miami Herald. Often these articles were in support of the counterrevolutionary organizations set up or supported by the CIA. Pamphlets, newspapers and leaflets published for the counterrevolutionary organizations were printed at the station or with CIA funds.

Swan Island was the station's radio broadcasting facility used to broadcast messages to agents in Cuba and as a major propaganda medium. Many broadcasts were also directed at Latin America. White, gray and black broadcasts were made, often designed to inflame Cuban refugees and others to join the counterrevolutionary organizations engaging in military attacks against Cuba.

The material presented here is a tiny fraction, the tip of the iceberg, of all that went on during my years with the CIA. By CIA's own admission this activity has covered a span of more than thirty years and continues to the present time.

The recent newspaper articles about such things as the alleged Hanoi spies among the Vietnamese refugees and the alleged Soviet combat brigades in Cuba have strikingly familiar qualities, very reminiscent of the phony fabrications I was exposed to during my employment with the Agency.

Like the tiger who having once tasted human flesh never loses his hunger for it, so the CIA will never lose its appetite for subversion, infiltration and manipulation of the media. This is one more reason why I advocate the complete dismantling of the CIA and the enactment of strong legislation to protect the U.S. and foreign media from abuses by the government.

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USSR

A senior case officer now in Moscow, USSR, is Bruce Edward Kressler, born February 3, 1936 in Pennsylvania. Kressler is listed in State Department records as having served in the Army overseas from 1958 to 1961, and there is no entry for 1962. This period may have involved deep cover. From 1963 to 1967 he is listed with the well-known cover of "analyst" for the Department of the Army, and then, in March 1968 first appears under diplomatic cover at the Foreign Service Institute language school in Taichung, Taiwan. In July 1969 he was posted to the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Embassy with the cover rank of economic-commercial officer. In 1972 he was back at Headquarters, and in May 1974 he was posted to the U.S. Mission to the

United Nations in New York, first as a "political-security affairs advisor" and then as a "political officer." In November 1974, however, records show him back at Headquarters, and, except for two advances in cover ratings in 1976 and 1978, no other postings are known until January 1979, when he shows up in Moscow.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

We have learned from Pentagon sources that James Elias Freeze, born August 21, 1931 in Iowa, was transferred this fall to the National Security Agency. He joined the Army in 1949 and shortly went into Military Intelligence, where he has remained ever since. In August 1975 he was promoted to Brigadier General, his present rank.

UNITA'S SAVIMBI SEEKS U.S. UNDERSTANDING—AGAIN

By Louis Wolf

The United States has a long history of waging undeclared wars. One relatively modest Brookings Institution estimate in 1975 produced a list of 215 official U.S. military deployments between January 1946 and May 1975. While many of the CIA's own paramilitary efforts around the globe, large and small, are not included in the list, the CIA's huge caper in Angola from 1974-76 will go down in the history of American interventions as one of the most destructive, and least productive (from the U.S. Government's standpoint).

The failure of the joint CIA-South African military operation that attempted to thwart the Angolan people's struggle for liberation from Portuguese colonial rule was amply documented by former CIA Angola Task Force chief, John Stockwell, in his remarkable book "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story." The CIA and South Africa pinned their hopes on two so-called "liberation movements," UNITA (led by Jonas Savimbi) and FNLA (led by Holden Roberto), to destroy the people's genuine liberation organization that had fought the Portuguese uninterruptedly since 1960, the MPLA. Both UNITA and FNLA were proven to have been propped up by U.S. and South African support as well as, in UNITA's case, by the Portuguese military.

Newsweek Supplies a Chaperone

It was in this context that Jonas Savimbi, the 44 year-old UNITA leader, arrived in New York on November 3 for a week-long visit to this country, his first since 1961. The decision to come here was, according to Newsweek, not even made by Savimbi, though it is not stated who did make the decision. In what had to be a carefully prearranged itinerary, Savimbi allegedly walked for four days, then rode by truck until reaching a secret rendezvous at "Point Delta." He was expecting, so the story goes, to begin his annual junket to drop in on the few African heads of state still friendly to UNITA. He was joined by Newsweek's star reporter Arnaud de Borchgrave (whose Western intelligence connections are self-admitted), and was informed -supposedly for the first time-that he was going to the United States instead. Together they flew across Africa "in a variety of unmarked planes, from a lumbering old DC-4 to a swift little (Lear) executive jet" (the latter supplied by the London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Company

The trip was sponsored by Freedom House in New York, on whose board White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sits (he is now listed "on leave"), and which trumpets itself as "a non-partisan, national organization devoted to the strengthening of free societies."

Savimbi spoke at Freedom House, to an audience packed with Cuban exiles. The co-sponsor was Social Democrats, U.S.A. whose executive director in New York City, Carl Gershman (described by Human Events—the national conservative weekly—as "a prominent anti-Communist liberal") exalted Savimbi, calling him "one of the most impressive political figures I have ever met."

The Freedom House Logo





The Social Democrats Logo

Although Savimbi said publicly he had not come to the U.S. seeking military or economic aid, but simply wanting "understanding," Newsweek's headline "Savimbi Asks For Help" was more candid, as was his statement to De Borchgrave: "You should help your friends help themselves." Those who followed his movements could see that, like the ex-Shah, he hadn't come halfway around the world just for his health.

Savimbi travels with three different non-Angolan passports including, he said, one issued by "an independent country," yet this irregularity somehow was no problem when he arrived at the immigration counter at the airport in New York. Although he was not an official state visitor, the U.S. government treated him like one. While in Washington, he and his party were, for the length of their three-day capital canvass, provided with two long, sleek black Cadillac limousines from the White House fleet.

Kissinger as Keystone

Despite not being registered with the Justice Department as an agent working for a foreign entity, one person, above all others, has lobbied most for Savimbi's cause. Both at the time of the huge CIA-South African thrust into Angola in 1974-76 and recently, in particular since the death of MPLA President Agostinho Neto in September, Savimbi has had the ardent backing of none other than Henry Kissinger. Their meeting together in New York on November 5 was "very fruitful" and the former Secretary of

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State was "extremely sympathetic and brotherly to our leader." a Savimbi aide told CAIB.

According to a photocopy of Savimbi's schedule seen by CAIB at one of his stops, he was slated to meet with other sympathetic people and groups as well. These included ex-energy czar and former CIA chief James Schlesinger, Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and Henry Jackson (Democrat, Washington), and House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill (Democrat, Massachusetts), all reportedly anxious to facilitate help for Savimbi and UNITA. Another meeting on Capitol Hill was with the Congressional Black Caucus, a group of 17 black members of Congress who have joined together around domestic and foreign policy issues. Though Caucus spokespeople were very tightlipped about the controversial event, organized on the initiative of Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Democrat, Michigan) but openly boycotted by some of its number, one justification given for the meeting was that some Caucus members feared Savimbi's backers in Congress might accuse them of being unwilling to "hear his side of the story.

Savimbi was feted as a dinner guest at the home of new AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, and also met at the AFL-CIO's downtown headquarters with Kirkland and a select group from their International Affairs Department—the CIA's well-worn channel for its global labor operations—including head of the African-American Labor Center, ex-Marine Patrick O'Farrell.

Coincidentally, Savimbi was slated to meet with Jerry Funk, former staff member of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (which shut down several years ago after it was exposed as being CIA-backed), and who then moved over to the AALC deputy directorship. He rose this year to a staff position at the National Security Council. Even though his name and a November 8th 3:30 p.m. appointment were on Savimbi's program, Funk tried to wriggle out of what could become a ticklish situation for the Administration by avowing to the Washington Post: "It simply is not going to happen."

Talking Strategic Turkey

For a guerrilla who has solicited and received aid from countries as disparate as the U.S. (the CIA), Portugal, France, North Korea, the Peoples Republic of China, Zaire and South Africa, it was intriguing to see the flattery that awaited him as he stepped to the lectern to address a crowded conference room at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington (see CAIB Number 3), where Henry Kissinger happens to have an office and where James Schlesinger and other "retirees" from the national security establishment sit as board and staff members or as advisors. After giving his presentation, entitled "The Strategic Role of Angola in the Subcontinent," it became apparent that he really was talking about the strategic role of UNITA. He spoke rhetorically about "the interests" and the "best interests" of the U.S., suggesting that UNITA should be seen by his audience in the latter category. In trying to illustrate this line, he admitted that

Mobutu Sese Seko, the President of Zaire (who has aided UNITA considerably), is corrupt, but asked: "Is it in the best interests of the United States to pay attention to this?" Despite his statement, "We do not want war," he was more honest as he spoke repeatedly and egomaniacally of "my war."

Savimbi's justification for "his war" is the Cuban presence in Angola, but not everybody in the audience was prepared to accept him as the "liberation fighter" he described himself as. Even though the figures he and his aides gave for the number of Cubans in the country varied widely—from 22,000 to 28,000 to 34,000 to 45,000 to "about 60,000"—(they lumped doctors, nurses, teachers, technicians, and soldiers together as "occupation forces"), some of those listening to him asked difficult questions.

One identifying himself as a South African said: "In the Kunene region of southern Angola, you are supported by South Africa. South Africa is bombing Angolans every day." To the surprise of many, Savimbi admitted: "Yes," then he launched into an unrelated speech on how he had "spent eight years in the bush fighting" (at another point he said it was ten years). Later in his talk he contradicted himself again, saying he is not now receiving aid from South Africa, although De Borchgrave reported Savimbi"... appeared to have no qualms about accepting help from South Africa." The UNITA boss even bragged in his CSIS talk about selling diamonds to South Africa for money to buy arms in various countries.

Who Me, a CIA Pawn?

Another questioner asked bluntly: "Are you in the CIA's pocket?" Savimbi chuckled nonchalantly and, after a thoughtful pause, said: "Really, I'm amazed of course. (In 1975) I addressed myself to the American administration, then I asked for help. If they give it to me through which channel, that's a domestic problem. . . . Even that Stockwell, he never told me he was with the CIA. He said only that he was an official, sent from Washington."

Even though Stockwell laid the facts out clearly in his book (and not even the CIA has challenged the veracity of them), CAIB asked him to comment on Savimbi's remark. Upon hearing that Savimbi denied any knowledge of the fact that he was from the CIA, Stockwell roundly demolished the assertion, stating that on one occasion not mentioned in his book, UNITA foreign minister Jorges Sangumba picked Stockwell up at the house of Stuart Methven, then the CIA Chief of Station in Kinshasa, and took him into Angola to meet with Savimbi. "I dealt with him (Savimbi) as both the CIA representative and the representative of Kissinger," Stockwell told CAIB.

It is obvious that Savimbi will measure the "understanding" he generated in the United States very literally—in dollars and cents, in tanks, in guns, and in bullets the U.S. sends him. He has addressed himself to the Carter Administration in full view of everyone this time. Will the Administration wade in once more, and "through which channel?"

Stockwell Scores Savimbi

Savimbi has received considerable media support, from coverage in the Washington Post as a "guerrilla leader," to fawning praise from former Nixon speech-writer William Safire. His latest piece drew the following response from John Stockwell, which appeared in the November 22, 1979 New York Times:

"To the Editor:

"William Safire's Nov. 8 column, about Jonas Savimbi (Mr. Savimbi, a college dropout, no Ph.D., no M.D.) was painfully inaccurate and misguided.

"Savimbi has no ideology. He believes in nothing beyond his own selfish ambitions, and fighting has become his way of life.



Jonas Savimbi

"Over the years in central Angola (13 years, not eight) he has fought against the Portuguese, the MPLA, the FNLA, SWAPO and the Cubans. A perennial loser, he has held his own only against the FNLA. He has accepted aid from North Korea, China, Rumania, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa and the CIA.

"From his CIA friends he learned to lie easily—they call it propaganda. In 1975-76, despite massive and intimate South African aid and CIA support, he lost the Angola civil war.

Since then he has survived in the wastelands of central Angola, but he is unable to show his face, except to raid, in any significant town or hamlet, and he has so completely lost popular support that he has resorted to urban terrorism even against his own Ovimbundu tribe—his movement, UNITA,

claims credit for bombing Ovimbundu marketplaces at prime time.

"The Ovimbundu people are paying the greatest price for the economic disruption he is causing, along with two historic United States allies, Zaire and Zambia. By blowing up an occasional bridge on the Benguela Railroad he has prevented the railroad's reopening, and our friends are unable to get their copper to the sea.

"Meanwhile, the legal Government of Angola has endeavored to cooperate with Zaire, Zambia and the United States in economic matters. They would reopen the railroad if Savimbi could be restrained.

"Gulf Oil, Texaco, Boeing and Arthur D. Little have major, ongoing projects in Angola. Cuban troops are helping to guard Gulf's installations from banditry and from FNLA and mercenary raids. And yet Mr. Safire chides President Carter and the State Department for cooperating with the Angolan Government at Savimbi's expense.

"But most unforgivable of all is Mr. Safire's endorsement of Savimbi's preposterous "kidnapped school kids" propaganda line.

"One of the most cherished prizes a young person in central Angola can dream of is a scholarship to travel and study abroad. In April, 1979, accompanied by a respected television producer and a private citizen, I visited the Angolan schools complex on the lovely Isle of Youth in Cuba (Safire's "former penal colony"). We were impressed with the students' morale and enthusiasm. Many of them were Ovimbundu. The president of the student body was Ovimbundu.

"As I grew up in the Congo, my mother wept every year when I went away to boarding school, and she wept when my sister followed me at age 8. But she sent us away because the alternative would have been sitting in her kitchen, trying to learn our three R's from her. Too many Congolese and Angolan mothers cannot teach their children the three R's because they are themselve illiterate, and the Cubans are proud of their international school system. I suggest Mr. Safire fly to Cuba and see for himself. If it offends us that Cubans are educating Africans, we might try to compete, to build comparable schools in the United States for young Angolans, Congolese and others.

"The United States has far too many problems in the third world to go seeking new bloody involvements with the likes of Savimbi. Witness Iran, and note that if Mr. Safire's advice were followed and we rearmed Savimbi (we tried it once and lost) we would almost certainly lose access to Angolan oil as well. The State Department deserves credit for its avoidance of Savimbi. Let us instead proceed to the next logical step: full diplomatic recognition of the legal and responsible Government of Angola.

John Stockwell Austin, Tex., Nov. 16, 1979

"The writer, a former CIA official, was head of the agency's covert operation in Angola."

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BOOK REVIEW

"Countercoup"
by Kermit Roosevelt
McGraw-Hill, 210 pp., \$12.95

Reviewed by Neville George

Neville George is a pseudonym for a man whose service in the Middle East extended over many years. He was in Iran before and after the CIA's Operation AJAX and he learned many of the details he describes from British and American intelligence agents.

This review was written for CAIB in October 1979. On November 7, 1979 the news broke that McGraw-Hill was withdrawing the entire first edition of this book after strenuous protests by the British Petroleum Company over the identification of its predecessor, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as the originator of the plan to overthrow Mossadegh; in fact, Roosevelt had used AIOC as a pseudonym for British intelligence. Our reviewer saw through this obvious subterfuge, and we have left his review as written.

The McGraw-Hill announcement, astonishing the publishing world, where it is unheard of for a major publisher to withdraw an entire edition which has been released, came at the time the Shah was in New York Hospital and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was occupied by militant students. As Mr. George said to CAIB, the book might "show what purposes the U.S. Embassy and its staff had in remaining in Tehran for nine months after any prudent government would have closed down the whole show and severed diplomatic relations." The publication of this book he suggests, may well have involved a CIA subsidy "in anticipation that events would dictate a new AJAX to rescue Iran for the West."

Thus, although the events recounted in Roosevelt's book are twenty-five years old, the significance of this review is immediate.

"The Struggle for Control of Iran" is the subtitle of this book which is being flogged as a "minute-by-minute" account of how a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt single-handedly masterminded "one of the greatest triumphs in America's covert operations in foreign countries"—the return of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock throne of Persia. Such extravagant praise is obviously calculated to chivvy the interest of mystery fans. At the end of the book,

however, the reader is left in a quandary: Why publish such a silly compendium of repetitious canards and intelligence miscalculations after the Pahlavi dynasty has been deposed and its corrupt and inhumane practices have been exposed?

If the author's objective was to make Henry Kissinger's memoirs read like an introvert's recounting of history, Kermit Roosevelt deserves full marks for effort! Perslifage and megalomania abound in the story, yet this book has some redeeming features: beneath its retrospective revisions of history; within its crude attempts to disguise identities; and, as a result of its efforts to denigrate Great Britain, the narrative bares more than it hides. It is, in fact, a story of how America's Central Intelligence Agency first became a determinant in U.S. foreign policy; its corollary is the instability one finds today in the Middle East (as well as in Latin America and South East Asia).

Spurious Strategy

Purporting to break his twenty-five year silence in respect of the CIA's Operation AJAX, Roosevelt alleges that this clandestine caper represented "an alliance of the Shah of Iran, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and 'other British representatives' with President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency." The object of AJAX was to replace Iranian Premier Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh who—according to intelligence Roosevelt neglected to share with the Foreign Office and the American State Department—is said to have formed an alliance of his own with the Soviet Union to expel the Shah and give Russia control of Iran. Forging the bonds holding AJAX together was no small accomplishment, but the author casts modesty aside and explains (ad nauseum!) how his unique background fitted him to do this.

Roosevelt's story, when read in connection with the memoirs of its principal characters, reveals just how forged the AJAX "alliance" really was. Foreign Secretary Eden opposed a coup in Iran; he was absent due to illness when stroke-invalided Winston Churchill gave Britain's blessing to what the CIA had presented as its plan to induce Iran to pay compensation for the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). John Foster Dulles decided to spare President Eisenhower the honor of knowing that he was a member of the AJAX "alliance" until the operation's results were known. We can therefore scratch two of the statesmen/plotters: Eden and Eisenhower.

Another chink in the alliance's armor was the Shah of Iran: he was not to be told that he was a member of the "alliance" or just how his nation was to be "saved!" One of the burdens of bearing the Roosevelt name was involved in this regard: we are told that the British made the "very sensible proposal" that the author be the AJAX "field

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commander" but that Secretary Dulles recoiled at the prospect of it becoming known that such a "prominent family name" was involved in covert political action. Roosevelt was finally appointed "commander" with the stipulation, however, that he stay away from anyone who might know him, "especially the Shah." Undaunted, the author sagaciously kept his own counsel. The situation might change, he confides to the reader, and should the Shah need convincing, Roosevelt knew that he had been endowed at birth with "exactly the right credentials."

And what about the "other British representatives" in the AJAX "alliance"? They, Roosevelt asks us to believe, consisted of the head of the AIOC (now British Petroleum Company) and that company's "agents" in the Middle East. One must wonder how even the CIA's "security considerations" can justify the author's decision to name a British oil company as a conspirator in an American plot to overthrow an Iranian government.

But coyly, obviously enjoying the tease, Roosevelt reveals by innuendo that he is really using "AIOC" as a synonym for Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or M16). We read of a "Mr. (later Sir John) Cochran" appearing in Washington to speak with John Foster (and Allen) Dulles in connection with AJAX. Square that, if you will, with the British custom of cloaking the enigmatic head of SIS with the anonymous initial "C" and with Roosevelt's reference to a "Mr. C" (indicating Cochran) as the chief AIOC representative. At that time, of course, "C" was actually Major General (later Sir John) Sinclair. It is easy to imagine Roosevelt slapping his knee in glee as he launched this double-entendre; just as one can envision Baron Strathalmond of Pumpherstone, who headed AIOC at the time of AJAX, concurrently spinning round in his coffin in high dudgeon over the book's implication that its author saved Iran single-handedly!

As for the British (AIOC-cum-SIS) contribution to AJAX, the author concedes that two "AIOC agents" proved to be useful, but he describes the principal AIOC role as simply providing communications. The company's "clandestine" radios in Tehran and Cyprus bridged Roosevelt's isolation from the "outside world." This, at a time when the American Embassy staff was being doubled to over 200 and another 1000-odd U.S. citizens lived in Iran, was rather comfortable "isolation."

Fiddling the Facts

The foregoing sets the tone of distortion and omission that prevails throughout the book. Roosevelt tells us he rejected as worthless a carefully prepared British plan for the replacement of Mossadegh, and the reader must wade through 155 pages of bumph to learn how the author will "play it by ear." Two things emerge with certainty: Roosevelt never had a proper operational scheme; and, always hoping to meet with the Shah, he even required British assistance in arranging a royal audience.

SIS set up a meeting in Switzerland between U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Meade [Air Force Major Charles Mason in the book] and the Shah's twin sister Princess Ashraf, who, with the Queen Mother, influenced everything the 33-year-old Iranian monarch said and did. Meade was to inform the Princess of Roosevelt's impending travel to Tehran to save her brother's kingdom; instead, fancying the beautiful Ashraf, the American colonel tried to bed rather than brief her with the result that she warned the Shah that the Americans could hardly be taken seriously. In the end the author found a retired U.S. general who was willing to say that a meeting between Roosevelt and the Shah would be essential, and agents of Israel's intelligence service were employed to assist the author in violating Washington's proscription.

Were it not for the fact that Roosevelt's "secret" meetings with the Shah were reported to Mossadegh immediately, the author's account of these charades could be amusing. After the monarch congratulated Roosevelt on his selection of the next Iranian prime minister, the American superspy undertook [personally!] to draw up the necessary royal decrees and to arrange for their service. The Shah and his empress were sent off to bask on the shores of the Caspian while Roosevelt completed his paperwork and performed his routine miracles. To instill confidence in the departing royal ears, the author contrived a bogus message and attributed it to President Eisenhower: "If the Pahlavis and the Roosevelts working together cannot solve this little problem, then there is no hope anywhere."

There was precious little reason for hope, as it turned out. Anti-Shah riots erupted to protest the "blown" American plot; the Shah fled in panic to Baghdad and Rome even as his statues were being toppled by mobs and calls for his head rang throughout Tehran. Having provoked the coup he had been sent to avoid, Roosevelt was ordered by the State Department to get out of Iran; instead, he ignored Washington's orders. The U.S. Air Force flew the vacationing American ambassador back to Tehran; he authorized the U.S. military mission to release masses of new equipment to support a mutiny by junior army officers Roosevelt's agents had managed to bribe. A subsidized mob was quickly formed and armed; it followed the rebel soldiers into the streets, but there were only faint calls for the return of the Shah. Assassins were sent off to do in Mossadegh and officials of his government and, when the prime minister went into hiding, retired General Fazlollah Zahedi (Roosevelt's candidate for premier) emerged from his cellar to ride an American tank to the officer's club where he proclaimed a new government. Control of Radio Tehran meant control of Iran; this was seized to tip the balance tenuously in favor of Zahedi and the Shah.

Over 300 Iranians were slain in the "pro-Shah" rioting, but Roosevelt neglects to record that grim statistic. Reports of a successful "countercoup" were fed to a New York Times correspondent brought in from Cairo; when his paper predicted the Shah's return, the monarch decided to come home. And just to be certain that history would justify Roosevelt's antics, there was a "convenient" writer (called a "political attache") on the U.S. Embassy staff: Donald N. Wilber, who is described by Roosevelt as "the most reliable historian on post World War II [Iran]."

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Why All the Bustle?

First off, Britain was not, as Roosevelt says, merely interested in recovering its Iranian oil concession—there was then a world crude surplus and a new refinery (to replace AIOC's at Abadan) had been constructed at Aden to process oil from Iraq, Kuwait, and other British fields. Nor was Britain unaware of Soviet interests in Persia; Great Britain had opposed Russia there before the American Republic was even formed!

Three factors were involved in America's decision to float AJAX: the interests of American oil companies; the CIA's determination to outshine British intelligence; and the obsession of the Dulles brothers with "International Communism." Foster Dulles was a confirmed Anglophobe, and his brother Allen had resented British intelligence since the days when he and the OSS had worked in the shadow of the British Security Coordinator's direct access to President Franklin Roosevelt. Kermit Roosevelt—who tells us he sacrificed his doctorate so that his thesis might serve as a guide to the organization of the OSS!—harbored similar resentment; the fledgling CIA was determined that British SIS would dance to an American tune.

Allen Dulles—no stranger to Iran as the author implies—had headed the State Department's Middle East division after World War I; then he'd invoked American pressure to force Britain and France to share their Middle East oil concessions with the American companies. Later, after advising President Truman on the formation of the CIA, Allen Dulles visited Iran and stayed with the American Arabassador. Finding that the Shah feared Turkey far more than Russia and that there was considerable agitation to move the British out of Iran, Allen Dulles saw a chance to make the Shah an American puppet and, at the same time, to justify the award of oil concessions to American companies to forestall an Iranian deal with the Soviets.

There had been another Roosevelt active in Iran before Kermit was able to parlay two brief visits into status as America's Persian "expert": he was Archibald Roosevelt who first came as an assistant military attache, and then went on to head CIA activities in Beirut and Istanbul. Oh he's in cousin Kermit's book as well—Archibald knew far more about the Middle East than the author—but, one can't have two of Teddy's grandsons sharing the glory of saving the Shah. Poor Archibald!: one has to dig him out of the "funny names" Kermit uses to preserve his paramount role. But between the Dulles brothers and the Roosevelt cousins, the OSS Establishment was revived and "Wild Bill" Donovan's cavaliers mounted and rode off to Iran to show Britain how to dominate a country.

That is what AJAX was really all about; it couldn't have taken place (as the author admits) under President Truman. He had disbanded the OSS and replaced it with the CIA in an attempt to make certain that intelligence was collected to advise foreign policy makers, instead of serving as a vehicle for the political action operations around which American foreign policy would have to be shaped. Once the myth of AJAX had been established, the sky

became the limit: Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial Sheikhdoms, Italy, Greece, Vietnam, Chile, and so forth!

People, Places, and Names

Roosevelt derisively refers to a distinguished British author's [Leonard Mosley's] use of pseudonyms for the characters involved in AJAX as "a convincing bit of arrogance!" and then he employs arrogation throughout this book. One might think security was his reason (as in the case of AIOC), but sheer shoddy writing emerges too often. Frequently he reveals enough about the people or organizations of which he writes to make them transparent to those who know the true story. But why would he write of landing at Rome's Fiumicino airport in 1953 when it wasn't opened until 1961? And what does moving the RAF airbase at Habbaniya in Iraq from west to "south" of Baghdad do except betray the author's confusion?

But to those of us who were in Tehran, moved to Beirut during the AJAX interregnum, and then returned to Iran, Roosevelt's use of "funny names" to cloak CIA personnel seems so foolish: they were all well-known; and, as the author admits was one of Colonel Meade's frailties, most couldn't resist bragging about the "AJAX miracle." Even in Beirut, the fact that the CIA was hatching a plot in Persia was common gossip: it was impossible to gather Roosevelt, Roger Goiran [George Cuvier], Joseph Goodwin [Bill Herman, and Goiran's replacement], and cousin Archibald [is he the man called Reynolds?] at the Hotel Saint Georges grill without tipping America's hand. Howard Stone and John Waller were well-known Tehran figures; Stone later tried, under Roosevelt's guidance, to engineer a coup in Syria and was nabbed in the act. Yet Roosevelt would ask us to believe that AJAX was his one and only venture into dirty work; he told Eisenhower, Churchill, and John Foster Dulles that the CIA wouldn't do such things unless it were "absolutely sure that people and the army want what we want." The Persian people and army let Mr. Roosevelt know how they felt in February, 1979!

As have most CIA seniors, Roosevelt claims to have known all about British spy Kim Philby for ten years before Philby defected to Russia from Lebanon; we are not told why he failed to share his knowledge with the British government. By allusion the author refers to James Angleton (who also "knew" about Philby!), the long-time head of the CIA's counterintelligence organization, who was fired by CIA director William Colby. Strangely, Roosevelt's only reference to his role, with Angleton, in building up the Iranian secret intelligence organization, SAVAK [the Persian acronym for the National Information and Security Organization], that kept the Shah in power through terror and brutality, cites a speech Colby made about this in 1978. Nor does the author credit Angleton for supplying the agents of Israel's Mossad [the first word, in Hebrew, of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments] who helped put over AJAX and later combined with the CIA to teach SAVAK new techniques. One must wonder how former CIA director Richard Helms, serving as America's ambassador in Tehran while

the plot to overthrow the Shah was hatched, failed to use the assets of the CIA, SAVAK and Mossad to let Washington know that AJAX was about to be set in reverse. Mossad's role in training SAVAK was surely a factor in the decision of Iran's new Islamic Republic to break relations with Israel, cut off its oil, and embrace the PLO, however.

What Price AJAX?

At one point in his book, Roosevelt opines that there might never have been an AJAX if the author had gone to China for the OSS (presumably he would have then "saved" that country from Mao Tse-tung!). But AJAX has been good to Kermit Roosevelt: with help from the Shah and General Zahedi's son Ardeshir (the Shah's last ambassador to Washington) Roosevelt has accumulated a handsome personal fortune. Registered in the United States as a "foreign agent" on behalf of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in which he worked for the CIA, Roosevelt has reaped generous commissions and retainers from aircraft companies, engineering firms, and weapons merchants. As a reward for procuring Gulf Oil Company's membership in the Iranian Oil Consortium, organized after AJAX, the author was made a Gulf vice-president, or at least given that title to cover his CIA activities.

Archibald Roosevelt has done very well as a result of CIA service. He returned from heading stations in the capitals of Europe to direct the Nixon-Kissinger collusion with the Shah to use Iraq's Kurds to depose the Iraqi government; when that fell flat, Archibald elected to retire. He, along with Kissinger, received his reward from the Rockefeller oil and banking interests, and "runs" the Middle East from a desk in the Chase Manhattan Bank.

And the Shah is far from indigent—he may have more money cached away than Iran has in its exchequer—though it is unlikely that his country will ever become the industrialized, European-type society that Roosevelt and the Americans advised Mohammed Reza Pahlavi that he should aspire to build.

To summarize this book, one might go to one of its characters to whom Kermit Roosevelt refers so frequently and foolishly: the Director General of Lebanon's Surete, Farid Chehab. This proud descendant of the Lebanese Emirs was well-known in the Middle East as a principal contact of the CIA; thus attributing the surname of Nashashibi—a Jordanian CIA agent!—to Farid and his wife Yolande does little to disguise them. With irritating frequency, Roosevelt quotes Chehab as sending the author off to "save" the shah from "Old Mossy" by citing "the traditional French hunter's" cry: "Merde a la chasse!" After reading Roosevelt's book, methinks "la chasse est merde" provides a suitable description of the author's AJAX saga.

Though denouncing the CIA for failing to heed his warning that the Bay of Pigs would turn into a disaster, Roosevelt cleanses his hands in closing. Grandfather Teddy may have won the battle of San Juan Hill, but it was the same men Kermit and Archibald Roosevelt recruited and tutored who lost Cuba for America in the end. As for the author's claim that his book represents his first admission of masterminding AJAX, one must hark back to his allegation that the Shah credited a combination of God and Kermit Roosevelt with having saved Iran. Possibly a combination of personal charm and Middle East knowledge enabled the author to accumulate his stable of commercial clients; however, it would not be idle to speculate that Mr. Roosevelt may at least have hinted modestly that he was praying very hard the day General Zahedi became Iran's prime minister.



NAMING NAMES

This is a regular feature of the CovertAction Information Bulletin. In view of the pending legislation which attempts to make a column such as this illegal, it is worth repeating what we said in our first issue a year and a half ago:

"We do not believe that one can separate the dirty work of the CIA from the people who perform it. The exposure of past operations is valuable, but it is only half the job. How many times have we all heard the CIA, the FBI and others say, whenever a particularly nasty covert operation has been exposed, Oh yes, but we don't do that anymore.' We believe that they do, and that the same people are often involved. As a service to our readers, and to progressive people around the world, we will continue to expose high-ranking CIA officials whenever and wherever we find them."

ARGENTINA

A case officer in Buenos Aires, Argentina is Judith Ann Edgette, born November 15, 1936. State Department records first show Ms. Edgette as a political officer with the cover rating of R-6, posted to the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in April 1972. In early 1973 she moved to the Embassy in Brasilia, and in April 1976 was transferred to the Embassy in Lima, Peru, still as a political officer. As of at least October 1979, she appears at the Buenos Aires Embassy. Her cover position is not known, but may well remain political officer.

BRAZIL

An extremely senior, and notorious CIA officer. Frederick Waldo Latrash, is now Chief of Station in Brasilia, Brazil. Latrash, born November 29, 1925, in New York, has been with the Agency since the late 1940s, serving as "Vice-Consul" in Calcutta, India from 1949 to 1951, and in New Delhi in 1951, followed by four years under cover as a "political analyst" for the Department of the Navy, and additional deep cover from 1954 to 1956. In 1956 he reappeared in State Department records, as Second Secretary in Amman, Jordan, where he spent three years. In 1960 he was transferred to Cairo, United Arab Republic, this time under AID cover, as an operations officer. He was in Cairo until at least late 1961, when records no longer show his whereabouts until 1963, when he reappeared again in State Department records as a political officer in Caracas, Venezuela. In 1965 he is found in Panama City, Panama; from 1967 to 1970 in Accra, Ghana, where he was Chief of Station; and then, in May 1971 he surfaced in his now well known role as Chief of

Station in Santiago, Chile, where he served until June 1973, overseeing the U.S.-orchestrated destabilization of the Allende government. From 1973 to 1975 he headed the station in La Paz, Bolivia; from 1975 until mid-1977 he did the same in Montevideo, Uruguay. He was then transferred back to Headquarters, and as of September 1979 has taken up the new post in Brasilia, accompanied by his Venezuelan wife Flor Teresa Padron. Latrash has presided over CIA machinations in many key countries at critical times, as the foregoing demonstrates.

HONG KONG

A senior case officer in Hong Kong is Graham Edmund Fuller, born November 28, 1937. Fuller served as a political officer in Jidda, Saudi Arabia from 1968 to 1971, and as a consular officer in Sana'a, Yemen Arab Republic in 1971 before being transferred in 1973 back to Headquarters. In 1975 he appeared at the Kabul, Afghanistan Embassy again as a political officer, and, as of December 1978 he was located at the Consulate General in Hong Kong.

INDIA

At the Consulate General in Madras, India the new Chief of Base appears to be John D. O'Shaughnessy, born November 5, 1939 in New York. O'Shaughnessy is listed in State Department records as a program analyst for AID from 1965 to 1967, transferring to diplomatic cover in 1968, as a political officer at the Accra, Ghana Embassy, where he served until 1971 when he returned to Headquarters. From 1974 to 1979 he does not appear in State Department records, but as of early November 1979 he resurfaced at the Madras Consulate General.



ITALY

A case officer recently transferred to the Rome, Italy Embassy is Charles Ronald Emmling. Emmling served as a political assistant in Rangoon, Burma from 1971 to 1974; and as a political officer in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for the next several years. Our source in Rome found him at the Rome Embassy as of July 1979.

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JAPAN

We have located two case officers at the Tokyo, Japan Embassy. One is Michael Allan Burns, born July 19, 1940. Department of State records show him at the Bangkok, Thailand Embassy, as political assistant, in 1969, transferring late that year to Singapore, for university training, before returning to Bangkok in 1970, as a political officer. He returned to Headquarters in 1973, and in 1974 was sent to the Taipei, Taiwan Embassy, as an economic-commercial officer. As of October 1978, records show him in Tokyo, in the political section once more.

The other officer in Tokyo is **Tom Roudebush**. Records indicate he was stationed in the Montevideo, Uruguay Embassy, in the political section, as of late 1976. The next record discovered shows that as of July 1979 he was in Tokyo.

MOROCCO

A relatively senior case officer has been located at the Casablanca, Morroco Consulate General, where he may be chief of Base. He is David R. Wilson, born November 6, 1936 in Pennsylvania. Wilson served overseas as a Marine lieutenant from 1958 to 1961, which may have been legitimate, or undercover. From 1962 to 1966 he was serving as a "training officer" for the Department of the Army in Pakistan, a relatively unusual cover position. In late 1966 he became an assistant training officer with AID cover in Amman, Jordan, and from 1969 to 1971 was a program officer for AID in Saigon, Vietnam, where he was undoubtedly part of the massive CIA operations there. In 1972 he was back at Headquarters for Arabic language training, and then spent the early 1970s in Beirut, Lebanon and Tripoli, Libya. As of September 1979 he appears in Casablanca.

ROMANIA

Thomas A. Witecki, whose biography appears in "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," has been transferred to the Bucharest, Romania Embassy. Witecki, born August 30, 1940, served under cover as a "programs officer" for the Department of the Army from 1965 to 1967, and spent from 1971 to 1976 at the Vienna, Austria Embassy under diplomatic cover, as economic-commercial officer and then as political officer. In 1976 he was transferred to Headquarters, and, as of October 1978, appeared in Bucharest. His cover position is not known.

SAUDI ARABIA

In 1979 a number of CIA transfers occurred from and to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, reports reaching us indicate that the entire station was "asked" to leave. This may be related to the interesting fact that in December 1977 the then CIA Chief of Station in Jidda, Raymond H. Close, "crossed the street," quitting the CIA and taking a job as advisor to the Saudi foreign intelligence chief. We have located two case officers now in Saudi Arabia.

One is Arnold C. Long, born December 30, 1943. Records first show Long at Headquarters in mid-1969. Later that year he went to the Consulate General in Calcutta, India serving there first as a "consular officer," and then as a political assistant. In 1971 he moved to the Embassy in New Delhi, this time as an economic-commercial officer, until returning to Headquarters in 1974. As of September 1976 he appeared at the Kabul, Afghanistan Embassy, in the economic section, and, finally, information as of September 1979 places him in Jidda, although we are not at present aware of his cover position.

Another case officer in Saudi Arabia is William Dennis Murray. Records indicate that Murray was at Headquarters in late 1975, and he showed up at the Jidda Embassy, in the economic section as of June 1979.

SINGAPORE

A well-known CIA operative, with considerable deep cover experience including a stint as a "journalist" with Forum World Features—an Agency news service proprietary till exposed in 1975—is the new Chief of Station in Singapore. The officer, Robert Gene Gately, born July 4, 1931 in Texas, was exposed in numerous newspapers and magazines, including the London Times, Time Out, Embassy and More magazines, in the spate of revelations on FWF which appeared between 1975 and 1978. State Department records list Gately as having served overseas in the Army from 1953 to 1955 and in "private experience" both as an "international trader" and as a "journalist" from 1955 to 1967. Most, if not all of this experience was in deep cover. From late 1965 to early 1967 Gately was the managing editor of FWF; in the late 1950s, he was a Newsweek executive in Tokyo. In 1967 he shows up in State Department employee status at CIA Headquarters; from 1968 to 1972 he was under diplomatic cover at the Osaka-Kobe, Japan Consulate General as a political officer; and in 1972 he was back again at Headquarters. From 1973 until late 1976 he served in Bangkok, Thailand, before returning once again to Headquarters. A source in Asia indicates that as of September 1979 he was at the Singapore Embassy. clearly as Chief of Station.

SPAIN

We have located a senior case officer in the Madrid, Spain, Embassy, Vincent Michael Shields, born September 21, 1937 in New York. Shields' records include the give-away service as a "research analyst" with the Department of the Army from 1963 to 1966, followed by "private experience" as an "aircraft specialist" with an "aviation development service," obviously deep cover. From 1971 to 1973 he is listed as a "plans officer" with the Department of the Army, additional obvious cover, and it is only in April 1973, after at least ten years under deep cover, that he emerges with diplomatic cover, this time as an economic-commercial officer at the Jakarta, Indonesia Embassy. In 1977 he was back at Headquarters, and, as of August 1979 we find him at the Madrid Embassy, in the political section.

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Studies on the CIA and the Media:

Landis, Fred, Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in Chile, 1970-1973. (This Ph.D. dissertation of over 300 pages is the definitive study of the use of the newspaper El Mercurio by the CIA in the campaign to destabilize and overthrow the Allende government. With graphs, charts and many illustrations.) Soft-bound photocopies may be obtained from CAIB for \$30.00, plus 50¢ postage U.S., \$1.00 overseas surface, \$5.00 overseas airmail.

The CIA and the Media, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, December 27, 28, 29, 1977, January 4, 5, and April 20, 1978. Printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office for the use of the Permanent Select Committee. (Contains the testimony, much but not all of which was reported in the news media at the time, of many present and former intelligence officials, and leading journalists, editors and publishers.)

Petrusenko, Vitaly, A Dangerous Game: CIA and the Mass Media, English version of the Russian original, published by Interpress, Prague, Czechoslovakia; \$5.50 plus 75¢ postage, from Imported Publications, Inc., 320 West Ohio Street, Chicago, IL 60610. (A fully annotated review of all the exposes, both in Congress and in the press, with valuable references.)

Chomsky, Noam, and Edward Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, two volumes, South End Press, Box 68, Astor Station, Boston, MA 02123, each volume \$5.50 paperback, \$15.00 hardcover. (Not limited to the CIA, this work presents an extremely worthwhile, detailed analysis of the role of the media in covering up and distorting the complicity of the U.S. government and the multinationals in repression and torture in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and, regarding postwar Indochina, "the media's rehabilitation of the bruised doctrinal system of the imperial powers.")

Other Publications of Interest:

Agrell, Wilhelm, Military Intelligence and the Information Explosion, Second Revised Edition, Discussion Paper No. 129 of the Research Policy Institute, University of Lund, Magistratsvagen 55N, S-222 44 Lund, Sweden. (A brief, interesting pamphlet which looks at the changing operational patterns of military intelligence in recent years, particularly the changes due to electronic development and ensuing "intelligence overkill.")

Center for National Security Studies, From Official Files: Abstracts of Documents on National Security and Civi! Liberties Available from the Center for National Security Studies Library, \$3.00 from CNSS, 122 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20002. (Self-explanatory. Good descriptions of all the Center's significant documents in the field, and the costs of copies from them.)

Chile Committees Newsletters. A number of groups around the country publish informative newsletters dealing primarily, but by no means exclusively, with Chilean resistance. Two valuable ones we have seen are: Pan y Agua, sent to contributors to the Chile Resistance Committee, P.O. Box 14248, Minneapolis, MN 55414. For a Free Chile, sent to contributors to the Chile Solidarity Committee, P.O. Box 4771, Kansas City, MO 64109.

Civil Liberties—A New War Casualty, by request from the Viet Nam Trial Support Committee, 1322 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. (A pamphlet describing the David Truong case, and the extent of government repression of dissent and abuse of espionage laws.)

Gombay, \$15 per year, airmail (Central America, Mexico and Caribbean), \$20 elsewhere, from Gombay Magazine, P.O. Box 927, Belize City, Belize, Central America. (The excellent monthly magazine of the Belize Institute of Friendship and Culture. Fine coverage of Central America and the Caribbean.)


Kohen, Arnold, and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 1.75 pounds sterling (plus 1.00 overseas airmail; .65 overseas seamail), from TAPOL (UK), 8a Treport Street, London SW18 2BP, United Kingdom. (A comprehensive look at the East Timor resistance and independence movement, the massive scale of Indonesian atrocities and killings, and the relationships of western policies to the issue. Especially timely in light of recent reports of widespread starvation since the Indonesian occupation.)

Lifschultz, Lawrence, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, \$6.50, from Monthly Review Press, 62 West 14th Street, New York, NY 10011, or 2.85 pounds sterling, from Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DN, United Kingdom. (An extremely well-documented journalistic look at the Bangladesh counter-revolution and the murder of Mujib, exposing the role of the United States, and especially the Pakistan/Bangladesh/India politics of Henry Kissinger. Includes a unique interview with a CIA station chief.)

Noyes, Dan, Raising Hell: A Citizens Guide to the Fine Art of Investigation, \$2.25 from Raising Hell, 607 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94105. (A pamphlet published by Mother Jones magazine, with many suggestions and resources for investigative journalism and reporting.)

Periodical Service:

Periodicals-By-Mail is a project designed to give wider accessibility to worthwhile periodicals not distributed through many newsstands. For a free list of over 70 alternative periodicals which can be ordered by mail, send name, address and a 15¢ stamp to: Periodicals-By-Mail, A Periodical Retreat, 336½ S. State, Ann Arbor, MI 48104.



SPECIAL OFFER

DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe

Edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf

This startling and invaluable expose of the C1A lists for \$24.95. If you order your copy through the CovertAction Information Bulletin and at the same time subscribe to the Bulletin, we will give you a \$10.00 discount. Overseas book orders must include \$2.00 for postage surface or \$8.00 for postage airmail.

We are pleased to inform our readers that "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," edited by Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karl Van Meter and Louis Wolf, will be published by Lyle Stuart, Inc. within the next several weeks. Our next issue will provide details for ordering this book, the second in the "Dirty Work" series, from the Covert Action Information Bulletin.

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THE TREASONOUS GUERRILLA: EXCERPTS FROM THE SAVIMBI LETTERS

During his recent expedition to New York and Washington, Jonas Savimbi spoke again and again about his long history of fighting against Portuguese colonialism, of having spent the last eight years (or was it ten?) in the bush, of struggling for the independence of the Angolan people, etc., etc. For some inexplicable reason, he forgot to mention how, for at least three years prior to the fall of the fascist Caetano regime in Portugal, he had been in direct secret correspondence with the Portuguese military, and was an active collaborator with the highest levels of the Portuguese government in its fight against the MPLA.

The letters, which were found in Lisbon after the Portuguese revolution, were first published in 1974 in the Paris magazine, Afrique-Asie, and appear verbatim translated from the original Portuguese in "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa." Here follow four brief excerpts from one of the letters:

Letter from Jonas Savimbi to General Luz Cunha (Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Angola), via General Bethencourt Rodrigues, September 26, 1972:

"Excellencies:

"Before getting to practical matters, I wish Your Excellencies to transmit my heartfelt compliments on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the coming to power of His Excellency Professor Marcelo Caetano, President of the Council of Ministers. I would also like to use this occasion to send my congratulations to His Excellency General Luz Cunha for his nomination to the very responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Angola."

"Our position is irreversible. We are no longer interested in the OAU, nor in Zambia, and even less in alliances with the MPLA. If these aspects of UNITA's policies are not yet sufficiently clear for the authorities in Angola and in Portugal, it is still an irrefutable fact: we have actively participated in the weakening of the MPLA in regions of the east. We have no illusions about alliances with the kind of people we have been fighting, and whom we continue to fight without letup. Whatever the thoughts of the government, we will never entertain taking up arms against the authorities. We use our arms so that one day we will force the MPLA to abandon the east."

"As regards camouflage, we will ask the timber merchants for another type of cloth, as you recommended, but I ask that, if possible, at least two good uniforms, in genuine camouflage cloth, be sent, one for me and one for Puna."

"I humbly ask Your Excellencies to accept my salutations and high esteem."

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